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ABSTRACT
In this study an attempt has been made to look at the 
effectiveness of credit in the process of agricultural development, given 
the existing source structure and utilisation patterns of rural credit in 
Pakistan. The study focuses on the borrowing behaviour of the small 
farm and tenant farm categories, relative to the other farm categories in 
Pakistan.
In the light of the economic, socio-cultural, historical and 
religious background of the area, the study identifies a set of factors 
that could affect the productive utilisation of credit. The study, using 
data from a large benchmark survey - the Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan, 
1972-73 - looks specifically at:
1) the problem of differential 'access’ to sources of 
credit
2) the role of institutional credit
3) the extent, nature and scope of non institutional 
credit
4) the utilisation patterns of credit, especially the 
relative importance of credit utilisation for 
purposes of current on farm expenditure and for 
consumption expenditure and expenditure on s.ocial 
ceremonies.
The analysis was severely constrained by limitations of data, arising 
out of the survey questionnaire design, the range of data available from 
the survey for analysis and the form in which it was available. In the 
light of these data constraints the study finds that 'access' to
Vinstitutional credit is dominated by the large farm and owner farm 
categories and that institutional credit plays a small almost insignificant 
role in the borrowing of the small farm and tenant farm categories. As a 
corollary to the dominance of non institutional credit, the study finds 
the existence of large scale (over 86 per cent of total) borrowing at zero 
rate of interest (nominal and explicit). The study also finds that credit 
utilisation for purposes of current on farm expenditure is relatively low 
in all farm categories, whereas credit utilisation for purposes of family 
consumption and for social ceremonies is relatively much higher, especially 
in the case of the small farm and tenant farm categories. The findings 
of this study seem to support the assertion that non institutional credit 
is largely "non productive" and in-the existing set up, credit on the whole 
is not playing its desired role in agricultural development.
The study highlights the constraints that exist to the effective 
utilisation of credit, the removal of which can hopefully lead to a 
catalytic role of credit in the overall agricultural development of Pakistan.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Need for Credit in Agricultural Development
There has been a sharp transition in economic doctrine with respect 
to the relative contribution of agriculture^ and industrial development 
to national economic growth during recent decades. There has been a 
shift away from an earlier ’industrial fundamentalism’ to an emphasis on 
the significance of growth in agricultural production and productivity for 
the overall development process (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971). The focus, 
especially in the context of the present-day Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) has sharpened with the rapid growth in demand for food brought 
about by rapid growth in population and high income elasticities of 
demand for food. This has led to a greater preoccupation on the part of 
governments to adopt policies that encourage agricultural growth.
Growth and development are contingent not only upon a sustained
2growth in production and population, but also in labour productivity.
With the growing population pressures on land and the declining land/man 
ratios, the emphasis is shifting more and more to land-saving technology 
to increase productivity and production. This technology is embodied in 
the so-called ’green revolution package’ of high yielding varieties, 
irrigation, fertilisers and pesticides, and improved crop husbandary,
1 The growth stage theorists (List, Marx, Rostow, etc.) and proponents 
of the dual economy models (Lewis, Fei and Ranis, Higgins, etc.) have 
highlighted the importance of agriculture in the process of economic 
development (Ruttan, 1965; 1969). The importance of the agricultural 
sector is variously stressed in terms of its contributions to
i) food and fibre; ii) labour for non-agriculture; iii) market for 
non-agricultural production; and iv) surplus for development.
2 See Kuznets, 1959.
3 See Kcyami and Ruttan, 1971.
1
which require an increased investment (monetised). This investment 
can either come from a saving process by the farmers or through borrowing. 
Given the subsistence nature of agriculture in most LDCs, the propensities 
to save are very low. This leaves recourse to credit to meet the required 
investment in the agricultural sector. In a perfectly competitive 
system, once the profitability of the technology is established, one 
would expect that credit would flow freely to the farm sector^ and 
thus ensure the increased production and productivity that agricultural 
development demands.
1.2 The Importance of Agriculture in Pakistan’s Economy
2Agriculture is the dominant sector of Pakistan’s economy. Although
the agricultural sector's share in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has
3been declining over time, it still stood at about 34 per cent in 1978.
In 1977, 54 million people or 74 per cent of Pakistan's population was 
rural and derived its livelihood either directly or indirectly from 
agriculture. Even when measured in the conventional sense, agriculture 
directly provided employment to about 54 per cent of the labour force, 
with another about 16 per cent of the labour force being employed in 
the agro-processing and trade sub-sectors, making a total of nearly 
70 per cent of the total labour force.
Agriculture's contribution to Pakistan's foreign trade is also 
significant. In 1976-77, agricultural exports accounted for about 
72 per cent of the total foreign exchange earnings.
1.3 The Performance of Agriculture
Despite the importance of the agricultural sector, the growth 
rate of agricultural output has not kept pace with that of the economy. 
This can be seen from Figure 1.1. The overall growth of GDP over the
1 To the point where the marginal value product of credit is equal 
to the price of credit (interest rate).
All data presented in this section, unless otherwise stated, are 
from the Government of Pakistan, 1977-78 'Pakistan Economic Survey', 
Finance Division, Islamabad.
3 Declined from 54 per cent in 1950.
3FIGURE 1.1
COMPARISON OF AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH WITH GDP 
(Constant Rupees)
220-
Gross Domestic Product 
Compound Rate 5.2%
Gross Agricultural Product 
Compound Rate 3.8%
100- '
1959-60
Year
Note: Statistical best-fit line intercept at 1959-60 equals 100
Source: WAPDA, 1979.
4period 1959-60 to 1977-78 has been 5.2 per cent whereas the growth rate 
of gross agricultural product has been only 3.8 per cent. It is also 
interesting to note the growth of gross agricultural output by sub-periods 
over this time. From 1959-60 to 1966-67 this rate was 3.6 per cent which 
increased to an impressive 7.5 per cent in the period 1966-67 to 1970-71, 
the era of the green revolution in Pakistan. However the performance of 
this sector has been disappointing during the 1970s with a low rate of 
1.9 per cent. This is even more alarming when it is considered in the 
light of the fact that despite the rural-urban migration, the population 
in the rural sector during the 1970s was growing at about 2.5 per cent.
1.4 Low Levels of Investment
Investment in the agricultural sector in Pakistan as a proportion 
of total investment has been declining. Table 1.1 shows the capital 
formation in agriculture during the period 1969-79 to 1976-77.
A number of trends become obvious. Although capital formation 
in the economy has increased from about 14 per cent to 18 per cent over 
the period, capital formation in agriculture has declined from about 
10 per cent to about 5 per cent. Public sector capital formation in 
agriculture as a ratio of public sector capital formation in the economy, 
which was about 34 per cent in 1969-70, dropped to 4 per cent in 1976-77 . 
Another aspect is the declining trend in the ratio of capital formation 
in agriculture to capital formation in the economy, which declined from 
23 per cent to 8 per cent over the period. This is despite the fact that 
private capital investment in agriculture actually grew" in relative terms. 
A number of inferences can be drawn from Table 1.1:
1) in relative terms there has been a declining role of 
government in the agricultural sector;
2) investment in agriculture has not kept pace with its
share in GDP;
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TABLE 1.1
CAPITAL FORMATION IN AGRICULTURE1 23AND THE ECONOMY 
(Fixed Capital Formation)
million rupees 
current prices
1969-70 1973-74 1976-77
Capital Formation in Agriculture
A. Private^ 476.1 612.1 1506.8
B. Public'1 1124.0 859.0 672.1
C. Subtotal 1600.1 1471.1 2178.9
D. Agricultural Product 15964.0 21907.0 44011.0
Capital Formation 
E. Private
in the Economy
3493.3 3726.3 7950.0
F. Public 3340.7 3920.2 18187.1
G. Subtotal 6834.0 7646.5 26137.1
h. Gross Domestic Product 47749.0 66515.0 145623.0
| x  100
(Ratio in Per Cent) 
23 19 8
f x 100 34 22 4
| x  100 33 33 30
f  x 100 14.3 11.5 18
x 100 10.02 6.72 ' 4.95
Notes: 1 In the absence of a comprehensive system of data collection in
Pakistan, an element of underestimation is to be expected. However 
since data collection has not improved over time, it is safe to 
assume that these figures reflect the trends over time.
2 Figures for private sector capital formation especially would 
generally underestimate true private sector investment.
3 Agriculture plus rural works programmes.
WAPDA, 1979Source:
63) the agricultural sector's output has contributed
towards capital formation outside the agricultural sector.
This is despite the fact that 54 per cent of the labour force
in agriculture produces only 34 per cent of GDP indicating
a substantially lower labour productivity in agriculture.'*’
The declining role of government in the agricultural sector is
symptomised by the niggardly development of research, extension and
infrastructure. The greater capital formation outside the agricultural
sector should not be taken to mean that the returns to private investment
in agriculture are not attractive. As will be shown later, there is a
tremendous potential for increasing agricultural output in Pakistan
with the required investment in fertiliser, seed, pesticide and water.
The reason for the lack of investment in agriculture probably lies in
the overall economic environment that existed in Pakistan in the 1970s.
The threat of land reforms (two out of the three carried out in Pakistan
were during the period of the early to mid 1970s) added to the overall
uncertainty in agriculture. The land holding structure in Pakistan is
such that a majority of the farms, i.e. 68 per cent, are below the
2 "subsistence level of land holding which account for only 30.4 per cent
of the area. The rest of the area is operated by the remaining 32 per cent 
3of the farmers. The distribution of land is skewed. Hence it is only 
the large landlords who are in a position to invest, and the predominant 
small farm sector has little or no investible surplus. However, the 
ominous threat of transfer of their 'land during this period to the tenants 
is said to have constrained their investment in agriculture.
1 According to Kuznets (1965), labour productivity is as dependent upon 
their (the labourers) education and skills as upon the material 
capital equipment with which they are provided.
2 Determined in Pakistan on the basis of produce index units to be 
on an average about 12.5 acres (PIDE,1978).
3 Based on the Government of Pakistan, Agricultural Census Organisation, 
Agricultural Census of Pakistan, 1972.
71.5 The Potential for Growth
There is great potential for increasing farm productivity and 
hence overall production with the use of high yielding varieties and the 
green revolution package of fertiliser, water, pesticides and proper 
cultural practices. A survey of leading farmers conducted by the 
masterplanning unit of the water and power development authority of 
Pakistan in 1979 confirmed this.
TABLE 1.2
CROP YIELD INCREASE POTENTIAL 
(Per Cent Increase Above Current Levels)
Crop
Factor Wheat Rice Cotton Sugarcane
Improved Water Management 20 10 10 10
Drainage & Salinity Control 10 10 15 10
Certified Seeds HYV 15 25 15 10
Fertiliser 45 40 20 30
Plant Protection 15 15 30 10
Other Cultural Practices 30 40 80 15
Total 135 140 170 85
Source: Water and Power Development Authority (1979)
Table 1.2 shows clearly that potential exists to increase- yields 
from 85 per cent to 170 per cent for different crops with the adoption 
of new technology. But the new technologies, quite apart from the other 
debates on adoption, require a higher proportion of purchased inputs which 
require larger working capital constraining the already meagre means of the 
average farmer who, as we have seen, lives at or below the subsistence level.
It has been observed in Pakistan that the small farm is a relatively 
more efficient unit. It generates a greater gross income per cultivated
* See also Table -2 which shows that 73.31 per cent of all households lie 
below the 15 acre size of farm category.
8acre and exhibits higher cropping intensity, as can be seen in Table 1.3.
TABLE 1.3
GROSS INCOME PER ACRE AND CROPPING INTENSITY BY SIZE OF FARM
*
Size of Holding 
(acres)
Gross Income Cropping Intensity
Per Acre Cultivated (Rs)
Up to 12.5 467.78 136.7
12.5 to 25.0 391.51 130.5
25.0 to 50.0 258.99 120.0
50.0 and above 134.35 116.0
JU
Note: Gross income = value of gross output. A better
been income net of costs. However, such data are 
Source: Farm accounts and family budgets of cultivators 
Board of Economic Enquiry, Punjab, Lahore.
measure would have 
not available, 
in the Punjab, 1973
It has also been shown that small farms absorb more labour. This
can be seen from Table 1.4
TABLE 1.4
LABOUR ABSORPTION BY SIZE OF FARM
Size of Farm 
(acres)
Labour Used
(mandays per cultivated acre)
Index
Less than 6.25 84 100.00
6.25 to 12.50 55 65.51
12.50 to 25.0 49 58.79
25.0 and above 39 46.38
Source: Farm accounts and family budgets of cultivators in the Punjab
Shadab Project, 1972.
Board of Economic Enquiry, Punjab, Lahore.
These features of the small farm sector are not particular to Pakistan 
Raj Krishna (1979) has found that such trends are characteristic of most 
developing countries (including Pakistan) with predominant small farm sectors
In such a situation, increased investment in "the green revolution package" 
by these small farmers can help achieve three important overall development 
obiec tives:
1) increase agricultural production;
2) provide greater employment; and
3) reduce the existing income inequalities that exist in the 
agricultural sector.
In the light of the above, it would seem that the provision of agricultural 
credit is one of the elements of a development strategy for Pakistan. 
However, the mere provision of credit is not enough. There are a number 
of problems that restrict its effective utilisation to achieve these 
objectives. A study of these problems is the focus of this thesis.
1.6 The Scope of the Study
In the light of a set of economic, socio-cultural, historical and
religious factors that characterise the agricultural sector of Pakistan,1 2 3
and that may have a bearing upon the effective utilisation of credit, this
3study attempts to look at:
1) the extent of the farmers' dependence on different sources 
of credit;
2) the differential access, if any, (of different farm categories) 
to the existing sources of credit;
3) the extent, nature and scope of informal borrowing 
(non-institutional credit); and
4) the historical assertion that the farmers of the
region borrow mainly for consumption and for social ceremonies.
4The focus is on the small farmers and farmers of the tenant
1 Aided by the divisible nature of the new tecnology inputs, i.e. 
fertiliser, seed, pesticides and water which would permit even 
very small doses of credit to have positive gains.
2 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of these aspects.
3 Unfortunately, because of the data constraint discussed later, it 
is not possible to set out the objectives in a precise hypothesis 
testing format.
The small farmer category, because the form in which the data are 
available, are defined as farms up to 5 acres. See Chapter 3.
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category relative to the behaviour of the rest of the farm categories.
The overall objective of the exercise is to examine the impediments, if any, 
to the utilisation of credit to increase agricultural production and 
productivity.
The study is a first attempt for Pakistan in this area at the
macro level.^ It draws upon as yet unpublished data from the Rural
2Credit Survey of Pakistan 1972-73, in which 94,082 households all over
3Pakistan were surveyed and the data thus collected were ’raised' to 
represent the 6.9 million households that make up the rural sector of 
Pakistan.
Because of limitations regarding the form in which the data are 
available, the analysis is for the most part tabular.^ However, because 
aggregate data were also available for seventeen districts, certain 
basic relationships indicated by the analysis are statistically tested 
in Chapter 6 using the Spearman Rank correlation.
1.7 Outline of the Study
The study is divided into seven chapters. Following this 
introduction, the second chapter looks at the role of capital in 
agricultural development, the importance of credit in subsistence 
agriculture and the possible factors that could interfere with the 
effective utilisation of credit to increase agricultural productivity 
and production in Pakistan. The third chapter deals with the survey 
methodology, its background and coverage, and the form in which the data 
are available. It also presents the characteristics of the borrowing 
households. The fourth chapter presents the background to the sources 
of supply of credit, and examines points 1, 2 and part of 3 of the
1 Although two micro level studies were conducted in the past, they 
were limited in coverage and scope. See Chapter 4.
2 See Chapter 3.
3 See Chapter 3.
4 Given the large sample size, the stratified random sampling procedure 
and the small per cent sampling errors (Chapter 3) it seems reasonable 
to assume that these tables closely approximate 'reality'.
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objectives of the study listed on page 9. The fifth chapter deals with 
the interest rate structure and its implications for the effective use 
of credit as an instrument for development. The sixth chapter looks at 
the utilisation patterns of credit, the share of productive on-farm'* ' 
utilisation in the overall credit used and the extent of credit used 
for different purposes. In the process it seeks to verify the historical 
assertion that the farmers of the region borrow mainly for consumption 
and social ceremonies. It also attempts to test statistically certain 
relationships between the supply of credit, credit use and income levels, 
in line with the objectives of the study. The last chapter presents a 
summary of the findings and their implications for an effective credit 
policy in Pakistan.
1 This study adopts a restrictive definition of ’productive’ utilization. 
Without getting into an involved debate on whether, say, credit 
utilization for consumption or for other purposes -is productive or not, 
we define for the purposes of this study credit utilized for expenditure 
on current on farm purposes (inputs) as productive and all other 
expenditure as non productive. The exclusion of capital expenditure 
on farm from this definition is serious.’'5' However, given the labour 
abundance that characterizes Pakistan’s agriculture, the stress should 
be on land saving technology that is embodied in ’the green revolution 
package’ of improved inputs. See Hayami and Ruttan, 1971 and Page 12, 
f . n. 2 .
* The data presented later on in this study deals with actual reported 
utilization of credit for different purposes irrespective of the 
purpose for which it was obtained.
** However, see page 82, footnote 2.
CHAPTER 2
CAPITAL, CREDIT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1 The Role of Capital in the Process of Agricultural Development
In the last chapter we looked at the importance of increasing
agricultural production and productivity'*’ in the overall development
2process. Given the fund of technical knowledge present in the world 
today, which could be advantageously applied in the productive process, 
one of the crucial constraints in most LDCs is the availability of 
capital (material) to make use of it.
The reasons for the low levels of capital formation in these LDCs 
are described by Nurkse (1953) through the existence of two vicious 
circles — one on the demand side and one on the supply side. On the
1 Productivity per capita in the context of agriculture can be 
represented as follows:
Y/L = A/L.Y/A
where
Y/L is productivity per capita 
A/L is land area per worker 
Y/A is land productivity
Given the increasing population pressures on land, the A/L component 
in LDCs is decreasing over time. Hence for an increase in Y/L greater 
emphasis has to be placed on increasing Y/A. Following Hicks (1932), 
technology (normally biological and chemical) that increases the Y/A 
component is variously referred to in the literature as land saving 
(or landesque). Technology (normally mechanical) that directly increases 
labour productivity is variously referred to as labour saving (or 
labouresque). See Hayami and Ruttan (1971), Sen (1959) and 2) below.
2 Technology exists that can facilitate the substitution of the relatively 
abundant (hence cheap) factors for relatively scarce (hence expensive) 
factors in the economy. For example, land saving technology is one 
that facilitates the substitution of industrial inputs (such as 
fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) and labour (through, for example, labour 
intensive a) cultural practices, b) management systems and c) increased 
recycling of soil fertility through conservation systems) for land.
Hayami and Ruttan (1971) find that in the process of agricultural 
development, land saving technology comes first and is followed by 
labour saving technology, which stands to reason in view of the abundant 
labour which characterises the LDCs.
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supply side he states that there is little, capacity to save resulting 
from low levels of real income, which reflect low productivity, which 
is the result of the small amount of capital used in production. The 
small amount of capital used is the result of the small capacity to save 
and so the circle is complete. On the demand side the inducement to 
invest may be low because of the small buying power of the people, 
which is due to their small real income, which again is due to low 
productivity. Productivity is low because of the small amount of 
capital used, which again is caused by the small inducement to invest.
The inducement to invest is limited by the extent of the market which 
in turn is eventually determined by the level of productivity. The 
essence of the argument is that levels of capital formation are low 
because productivity is low, and productivity is low because levels of 
capital formation are low. The classical school of economic theorists, 
to which Nurkse belongs, stress the role of capital in economic 
development.
The Neoclassical school, as represented by Schultz (1964), also 
recognises the low levels of savings and investment in the LDCs, but 
states that savings and hence investment levels are low because of 
the low marginal rates of return to investment in traditional agriculture.
It can be seen from the above that the role of capital in the 
process of economic development is accepted by economists of both 
persuasions. The difference lies only in their respective emphasis of it.
Kuznets (1959) also recognises the low levels of capital formation 
(and the accompanying low levels of productivity) in the LDCs but 
brings out an important aspect related to this problem. He states that,
1 A discussion of the existence or otherwise of inefficiencies of 
factor use or distortions in the factor markets in the process 
of development, that form the essential basis of the differences 
in the two schools of thought, is beyond the scope of this study.
At this point we are merely trying to show that increased investment 
is a necessary condition for increasing productivity and production.
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given the possibly wider inequality in the size distribution of income 
in the LDCs, the proportions to national income of gross savings 
originating amongst the upper income groups may well be higher than 
(or at least equal to or not much smaller than) those in the more 
developed countries. However, in the LDCs, a greater proportion of 
these savings may finance the consumption needs of the lower income 
groups or a greater proportion of such savings may go into hoards of 
precious metals and ornaments rather than into productive investment.
For the puposes of increasing productivity and production, not only 
is an increased level of capital formation crucial, but the utilisation 
of this capital for productive investment is equally important.
2.2 The Nature of Demand for Credit in Subsistence Agriculture
In traditional and subsistence oriented agricultures like Pakistan, 
there is little saving generated, especially in the farm categories 
close to the margin of subsistence. In such a situation the importance 
of credit is self-evident.
Mellor (1966) states that in a subsistence oriented agriculture:
...the problems of finance and credit arise in a large part 
from a seasonal cycle of production which is superimposed 
on a largely nonseasonal or steady pattern of total consumption. 
The production from agriculture normally comes at one or a few 
concentrated periods of harvest, while consumption occurs 
relatively steadily throughout the year. Even production inputs 
tend to be required either steadily throughout the year or at 
concentrated periods at times other than at harvest. Thus 
provision for consumption and production inputs requires either 
a saving process, from the past harvest or credit borrowed 
against a future harvest.
Belshaw (1959) has contended that the demand for production credit 
arises in two stages:
First the farmer must perceive the existence of a potential 
for the increase of income from his farming enterprises and 
secondly the activities necessary to realise this potential 
must require capital in excess of the resources available
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with him.
2.3 The Demand for Production Credit
Conceptually one can view the demand for agricultural credit
2as a derived demand - derived from the demand for expenditure on
3different aspects of the farming enterprise. The demand for production
4credit can be seen to be influenced by the following factors:
1) The productive opportunity of the farmer;
2) The farmer'' s initial endowment;
3) The farmer's objective function;
4) The farmer's attitude towards risk and degree of uncertainty.
One can reason that the higher the farmer's productive opportunity, the greater
will be the quantum of demand for credit. Simultaneously, the greater the 
farmer's initial resource endowments (home produced inputs and cash, savings 
or working capital), the lesser will be the quantum of demand for credit.
This would mean that the size of the farmer's operational holding is of 
crucial importance in the determination of the demand for credit. Since 
'endowments do not necessarily correspond to opportunities' (Mckinnon, 1973), 
and as we have shown in Chapter 1, small farms in Pakistan have a greater 
productive potential, this coupled with their smaller initial endowments
would imply a large demand for credit. This does not mean that the absolute
1 However, Belshaw (1959) has also contended that the characteristics 
of the society in which the farmer exists affect the conditions that 
prevail in these two stages and hence the eventual determination of the 
nature and quantum of the demand for credit. These characteristics 
can be socio-cultural and/or economic.
2 This can be expenditure on investment purposes (both capital and 
current) on farm or on family consumption etc. or on other purposes 
connected to the farming enterprise or combinations thereof. However, 
following Lipton (1976), given the composite nature of the farming 
enterprise, it becomes very difficult to separate demand for one from 
the other. Here we are dealing with production credit only.
3 The demand for investment credit is a function of the cost of credit, 
the marginal efficiency of capital and the awareness of the farmers.
4 See Hirshleifer, 1970 and Ahmed (1980). However, because we do not 
have the requisite data this model cannot be emperically tested. The 
Rural Credit Survey did not elicit information on these aspects and it 
is not possible to extrapolate from the available data.
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amounts of credit demanded would be greater on a per household basis, but 
that the demand curve for the small farmer under the influence of the two 
factors described above can be expected to be relatively more inelastic 
(with respect to price (rate of interest) than that of the large farmers.
If the farmers objective function is the maximisation of the farm 
income through an increase in production over time, he can be expected 
to have a greater demand for credit. However, on the other hand, if he 
seeks to maximise his social prestige, he may demand minimally for 
production purposes and largely for non-productive purposes.
The farmers’ attitudes towards risk and uncertainty are subjective 
phenomena that can affect the demand for credit. One can expect large 
farmers to be less risk-averse because of their greater capacity 
to absorb the effect of the risk factor. In an economy where subsistence 
agriculture is dominant, it can be argued that the significance of market 
risk is greatly reduced as production is largely for home consumption.
If subsistence agriculture is also characterised by static technology, 
the relevance of risk is further diminished, as it can be expected 
that the farmers’ expectations would have been sharpened by historical 
experience. This does not, however, mean that the risk factor can 
be totally excluded. It is dependent upon subjective attitudes towards 
risk, which vary from individual to individual, and on a number of factors 
that in turn can influence these attitudes. The profitability of a 
particular technology and the demonstration effect of_ such gains are 
two such factors that can affect the degree of risk aversion.
Lowdermilk (1972) found that depite the relatively poor economic 
condition of the small farmers and their limited access to credit, a 
large proportion of small farmers adopted high yielding dwarf wheat 
varieties in Pakistan (in a very short period of time) because of the 
tremendous gains involved.
1 Expenditure on social ceremonies and osfentateous consumption, for example
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In a perfectly competitive market, the price of credit (the interest 
rate) would be given, (determined by the intersection of the aggregate 
demand and supply curves) and would be the same for all.'*' Individual 
equilibrium quantities of credit obtained would be determined by the 
intersection of this price and the respective demand curves. In this 
perfect hypothetical situation, this credit would then be employed to 
realise the productive potential of the farmer and lead to the desired 
increments in production and productivity.
2.4 The Importance of Credit in Agricultural Development: the Experience
of the LDCs
A large body of literature on agriculture as a vehicle for development 
highlights the importance of credit, especially in the context of the under­
developed or less developed countries of today. It centres around the 
premise that the majority of the farmers in these countries are small and 
poor. They are thus constrained in increasing their farm production by a 
lack of capital with which to take advantage of the array of techniques 
available. This awareness has heightened since the agricultural revolution 
of the mid 1960s and more and more writers are of the view that adoption of 
the new technologies is restrained in most cases due to the capital
constraint. It is felt that:
Not only can credit remove a financial constraint, but it 
may accelerate the adoption of new technologies. CredJt 
facilities are also an integral part of the process of 
commercialisation of the rural economy. (World Bank, 1975)
It would be worthwhile here to look at some evidence from the
developing countries to determine the importance of credit in
2agricultural development. Theoretically, credit is ä powerful economic 
tool as it facilitates a borrower's shift to a higher production 
possibility curve with a greater command over resources. Rao (1970) 
found that capital with scientific knowledge was the key combination
that accounted for growth in Indian agriculture and not land and labour,
1 This is a hypothetical case. See Chapter 5, Section 5.2 on the 
determination of the interest rate, especially BottomJey (1975).
2 It is interesting to note that most of the studies showing that extra 
credit will increase farm returns and incomes do not make specific 
assumptions regarding the rates of interest. The opportunity cost of 
additional credit provided to farmers, is an important aspect often ignored.
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since according to him ’the frontiers of land have more or less been 
reached and labour is an abundant resource whose marginal product in 
the absence of capital to raise it, is near zero*. A credit policy was 
therefore an important means towards achieving developmental objectives.
In a study of farmers in Rajasthan in India, Agarawal and Kumarwat 
(1974) found that there was capital rationing in farms of all sizes in 
spite of an existing potential for increasing incomes even at the 
prevailing level of technology. Adoption of new technology without any 
credit tended to decrease farm incomes rather than increase them. The 
authors concluded that new technology and credit used in combination 
increased incomes in all sizes of farms by about 73 per cent. In an 
econometric analysis conducted in India, Lavania et al.(1969) found 
that the effect of credit on productivity was positive. The study by 
Bhadur (1975) provides additional support to this finding.
Subramanyam and Patel (1973) studied the impact of credit on farm 
incomes and estimated the short term credit needs of different farm 
sizes in the West Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh in India. They 
found that credit helped all size categories but small farms were 
helped most, and that a shortage of capital contributed heavily to 
the low adoption of new technology. A study by Dwarkinath et al.(1974), 
attempting to estimate the potentialities of marginal farmers for 
agricultural development through the use of agricultural credit, 
showed that farmers made good use of credit and with technical support 
from extension programmes, credit use could be more fruitful. In a 
study of production credit needs in developing agricultures, it was 
found by Sharma and Prasad (1971) that for India, adequate use of 
credit increased farmers’ incomes even without adopting new technologies.
Similar evidence was found in Bangladesh by Raquib (1977) who 
concluded that 'an adequate supply of formal credit could contribute
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substantially to raising crop intensities and a change in the crop mixes 
of the farms in favour of adoption of high yield variety crops'.
In the case of Pakistan also, lack of access to credit has been 
cited as a reason why small farmers delayed in the adoption of the 
new technology of the green revolution (Khan, 1975). In the two 
studies by Naseem (1973; 1975) it is shown that the small farmers in 
the Punjab on the whole, and all the farmers of the Sahiwal district of 
the Punjab, generally considered that the lack of capital for the 
purchase of variable inputs such as seeds, fertiliser and pesticides, 
and for capital costs such as the installation of tubewells etc., as 
their main constraints.
Lowdermilk’s (1972) study of the diffusion of dwarf wheat 
varieties in Pakistan's Punjab shows that credit availability is 
significantly related to the level and use of nitrogenous fertiliser 
for the new wheat varieties. Anderson (1976) also found a positive 
correlation between credit availability and fertiliser use for wheat 
production in Pakistan.
2.5 Possible Factors That Can Reduce the Effectiveness of Credit
as a Policy Instrument: the case of Pakistan
It would seem from the foregoing that the mere availability of
credit would ensure the development objectives of greater production and
productivity. However, there are a number of factors that could mar
the effectiveness of credit as a policy instrument in LDCs in general
and Pakistan in particular. These have their roots in the economic,
socio-cultural, historical and religious background of the area.
Foremost amongst these is the fact that:
’...any sensible person, given a loan sees that his family does 
not starve, second uses the residual for high priority (high
1 'Mere availability of credit will not persuade farmers to adopt 
a particular technology' (FAO,1975).
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return) outlays; and only then considers what profitable 
(e.g. on the farm) investment he can make’. (Lipton, 1976)
Penny (1968), in an analysis of farm credit policy in LDCs, questions the
usefulness of credit especially in the early stages of economic growth.
Both he and Tagumpay-Castillo (1968) contend that the attitude of peasant
farmers towards debt makes cheap credit an unlikely growth stimulus.
Bernard (1973) in a study of a Malay village found that peasant farmers
are averse to investing in production. Savings and credit were mostly
used for consumption because the expansion of economic enterprise was
against the norms of the existing social system. He points out that
more adaptation was necessary in the social system before effective
2utilisation could take place.
There are a number of possible factors specific to Pakistan that
could on a priori expectation reduce the effectiveness of credit policy
to meet the country’s development objectives. The economic and social
and political influence of the large farm sector, born out of the
skewed distribution of land ownership and the resultant development
over time of the social hierarchy, enables them to monopolise all
profitable enterprise in the economy. It is expected that the large
3farm sector monopolises access to the cheaper sources of credit. This 
would imply that the small farmer, who has <_he greater productive 
potential and whose need is greater(in terms of the initial endowment 
mentioned earlier), is starved. This credit starvation is a circular 
phenomenon. It serves to strengthen an attitude in the mind of the small
1 These high returns depend on the society within which the individual 
operates and, as will be shown later, need not be monetary in nature.
2 This runs counter to neoclassical reasoning as embodied in the 
’poor but efficient' doctrine.
3 We are referring here to institutional sources of credit, which 
in the case of Pakistan are subsidised. See Chapter 5.
We will attempt to show later that non-institutional credit in 
Pakistan is largely non-productive.
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farmer that his access to productive credit is limited and hence to a 
reduction in his demand for such credit in the next round. The possible 
monopoly of access by the large farm sector of the institutional credit 
can also be attributed to the more stringent collateral requirements 
of institutional sources, but its net result is a rationing of credit 
in terms of existing wealth. From a macro point of view, such a 
monopoly of access^ to institutional credit would be inefficient on 
two grounds:
a) it does not lead to a realisation of the true productive 
potential of the agricultural sector, and
b) it leads to a further widening of inequalities.
Another factor on the supply side can be the relative dominance of
non-institutional credit, or put another way, the small share of
institutional credit, in the overall source structure. It is postulated
that non-institutional credit is largely non-productive in nature. This has
its roots in the historical and socio-cultural background of the area.
In the area that is now a major part of Pakistan, the problem of 
2chronic debt was recorded by Darling (1925) who wrote that the 'Punjab 
peasant is born in debt, lives in debt and dies in debt'. The same 
author writes:
3
'...the muhammadan has a natural contempt for accounts and 
rarely checks expenditure until his elbow is unpleasantly 
jogged by the money lender. This incompetence in money matters, 
combined with the prohibition against usury which he has 
inherited from the law of Moses, puts him at the mercy of the 
money lender, who consequently thrives'. (Darling, 1925)
The money lenders were mostly Hindus and dominated the economic scene
with a stifling hold that was at once exploitative and vicious (Darling,
1925). It is variously held that one of the reasons for the partition
1 This will be examined in Chapter 4.
2 We will go into the causes of this debt later in this section.
3 Muslim majority areas of former British India now form Pakistan.
of India and the founding of Pakistan was the result of this exploitation
of the Punjab farmers by the money lenders.'*' When the Hindu money lenders
left in 1947 after Pakistan came into being, they left behind a general
2aversion to borrowing and a vacuum in the overall supply of credit.
3 1This vacuum was filled largely by friends and relatives and landlords.(See
Table 4.1). On the assumption that the friends and relatives belong to
the same caste and hence the same economic strata (in the case of the
dominant small farm sector, they would all be at or near subsistence
levels) it can be asserted that such lending can only be for consumption
4puposes or for social ceremonies, to preserve the izzat of a member 
of the caste or clan.~*
It is difficult to visualise a small farmer dipping into his own 
meagre resources to lend money to a friend or relative, who would employ 
it to increase his production, while the lender goes without. Lending 
between friends and relatives is lending between equals on the basis of 
reciprocity. Lending by landlords (lending between unequals) is based 
on the perpetuation of the patron-clientele relationship. In a region 
•where social and economic position is jealously guarded, one cannot 
visualise a large landlord lending to a smaller farmer so that he
1 Darling (1925) notes that in 1925 it was unlikely that more than 
17 per cent of the proprietors in the Punjab were free of debt.
2 Which is only undertaken in times of distress, i.e. for consumption 
purposes or to meet the cruel demands of social ceremonies, as we 
shall see later.
3 There is a greater unity amongst different castes in the Punjab, based 
an interdependence and being driven together by economic deprivation. 
Miller (1955) notes ’Not only do castes interlock within the village 
to form an adhesive whole, but the spread of castes over several 
villages serves to form an interlocking mesh'. He goes on to say 
'Although by their religious belief all men tend to be equal.... the 
Sikhs and Muslims did not form two single castes.... in areas largely 
Sikh or Muslim in East and West Punjab there are (still) a number
of interdependent castes'.
4 Izzat is a concept akin to honour (but much stronger) that dictates 
the every day life of the populace. Obligations and rights are 
reciprocal.
on
5 Loans from friends and relatives are generally on the basis of 
reciprocity.
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can better his lot economically. On the other hand a landlord lending 
to a poor small farmer who is starving or has to marry a daughter or 
bury a relative only adds to the prestige of the landlord.
Another feature of the system and a corollary of non-institutional 
credit is the presence of borrowing at a zero rate of interest. Islam, 
the religion of the region, strictly forbids the charging of interest 
and there are tremendous resultant social pressures against those that 
do.^ This characteristic further strengthens the argument that 
non-institutional credit is non-productive. In the absence of any 
monetary return to lending, it is rational to expect that loans will 
only be made for purposes that have some 'social* returns (in terms of 
an enhancement of the prestige of the lender).
On the utilisation side also there are a number of possible 
factors (which could reduce the effectiveness of credit) that have 
their roots in the cultural and social background of the region.
.... the great majority of agricultural debtors get into debt 
through improvident expenditure upon domestic ceremonies and
in particular upon marriages...... case are common when a
ryot - will admit having spent twenty years rental on marriage; 
they are not uncommon when he will admit having spent fifty 
years rental. Even when credit is controlled as it is in a 
village bank, extravagant sums are spent. (Darling, 1925)
In the curious cultural and social set up when a girl and a boy 
are married, the girl's family, caste and village become 'lower' than 
that of the boy (Srinvas, 1955). In order to ensure good treatment for 
the girl, and as a matter of izzat, the girl's family spare no expense 
to give their daughter a 'reasonable' dowry consisting"of gold, jewTellery, 
clothes and household goods, and to arrange a lavish feast on the 
occasion. A man's izzat is measured by what he gives his daughters, 
and by the lavishness of the wedding festivities. The boy's family also,
1 One of the most caustic abuses in the language is sood khor, which 
means one who lives on earnings from interest, and who is therefore, 
in orthodox Islam, immoral.
2 Ryot means a cultivating tenant.
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not to be outdone especially in view of their 'higher' status, spare
no effort to outspend their new relatives, for all to see. The same
pattern of ostentatious expenditure is repeated for births, deaths,
2circumcisions and a number of annual religious festivals.
Darling (1925) has in his meticulous account of the Punjab peasant 
in prosperity and debt emphasised three basic factors which compel the 
peasant proprietors to borrow. These are:
1) the smallness of the ordinary holding and its grotesque 
fragmentation;
2) the profound insecurity of agricultural conditions, combined 
with a general improvidence; and most of all,
33) extravagant expenditure upon marriages and domestic ceremonial.
2.6 The Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan: a benchmark
In the light of the economic, socio-cultural, historical and 
religious aspects outlined above which characterise the rural sector of 
Pakistan, it becomes important to study the effectiveness of credit as 
a policy instrument in the process of the agricultural development of the 
area. Unfortunately, apart from two small surveys^ of a limited 
geographical coverage, previously there were no data available in 
Pakistan on the subject. The Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan, 1972-73, 
is a benchmark survey in this area. As a benchmark it provides a 
starting point, and an interesting, one point in time, picture of the 
rural credit situation in Pakistan. It enables one to estimate the 
extent of the effect of the factors outlined in the previous section,
1 Social 'status' is also determined by the number of acres of land and the 
number of animals owned by the individual irrespective of their productivity.
2 It is interesting to note that the religion (Islam) strictly preaches 
moderation and modesty in all aspects of life, so that these ostentatious 
ceremonies and festivals are a cultural development like the development 
of different castes within the Muslims, as mentioned earlier.
3 'In addition', Darling goes on to state, 'there are two causes which 
facilitate borrowing - facile credit and a vicious system of money lending'.
4 See Chapter 4.
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and as such the effectiveness or otherwise of agricultural credit as 
a catalyst for increasing agricultural production and productivity 
in Pakistan.
2.7 Summary
1) Increased investment is a necessary condition for increased 
agricultural productivity.
2) In subsistence agriculture, the role of credit is more 
crucial for agricultural development.
3) Small farms and tenant farms have a greater need for credit 
in view of their smaller initial endowment.
4) There are a host of economic, socio-cultural, historical and 
religious factors that can, on a priori expectations, restrict 
the effective utilisation of credit in Pakistan.
5) The relative importance of these factors can be expected to 
change over time. It is therefore important to estimate
the extent of their influence on effective credit utilization. 
The Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan, 1972-73, is a 
bench mark survey that permits such an analysis.
CHAPTER 3
THE SURVEY, METHODOLOGY, DATA AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE BORROWING HOUSEHOLDS
3.1 Objectives and Background
This study is based on data from the Rural Credit Survey of
Pakistan.^ This survey was conducted in early 1973 (January to March)
at the behest of the State Bank of Pakistan by the Agricultural Census
Organisation of Pakistan. Its main objectives were:
...to know the present state of rural indebtedness and to 
assess the future credit needs of the rural population in 
general and of the farmers in particular. Besides it was 
intended to ascertain through this survey the share of 
different agencies in providing rural credit, the purposes 
for which credit was obtained, and the terms for obtaining 
credit. (Government of Pakistan, 1974)
Supervised by a team of experts from the State Bank of Pakistan, a
questionnaire spread over four pages was drawn up (Appendix 3.1).
Ideally all aspects of rural credit such as incomes, wealth
and savings should have been covered, but these three vital areas were
dropped as it was considered that ’reliable information on these items
could not be collected through such a large survey’ (Government of
Pakistan, 1974).
3.2 Sampling Plan and Geographic Coverage
The administrative structure of Pakistan can be seen from
Figure 3.1. A Mauza is the smallest unit composed of a number of
households. It can form part of a village, or a village, or a small
2group of villages, depending on the size of the village. The Rural
1 As indicated in Chapter 1, the data from this survey have not been 
published as yet. However, this author’s connection with his 
employing organisation, the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
consultants to the State Bank of Pakistan, provided access to a set
of preliminary tables and background material on the survey.
2 At the time of the survey there were 40,250 Mauzas making up 
1480 Patwar circles in 224 Tehsils/Talukas of the 46 districts 
the 4 provinces of Pakistan.
in
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Credit Survey covered the entire country. Map 1 shows the location of 
the different provinces and districts of Pakistan.
FIGURE 3.1
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN
PAKISTAN
PROVINCES
DISTRICTS
TEHSILS/TALUKASI
PATWARS
MAUZAS
The availability of sampling material gathered in connection 
with the Agricultural Census made it possible to select a sufficiently 
'small' though representative sample for the credit survey, in addition 
to facilitating the use of the sketch maps of the sample Mauzas, and 
the list of households, etc.
The sample design for the rural credit survey was a multi-stage 
probability sample. In the first two stages, the sample for the credit 
survey constituted a sub-sample of the corresponding units of the 
agricultural census sample, whereas the sample for the third stage was 
clusters of households directly selected from the households listed in 
the second stage units of the census sample.
Stage 1 Half of the Patwar circles were selected randomly from 
the agriculture census frames.
Stage 2 For the agriculture census, two Mauzas were randomly
selected in each Patwar circle. For the credit survey,
1 Except the tribal areas of the North West Frontier province, and 
certain small areas of the District of Sialkot in the province of 
Punjab and District Tharparker in Sind province that had been 
ravaged by the war of 1971, and the Kohlu and Kohan tehsils in 
Baluchistan province (See Map 1).
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one of these was randomly selected.
Stage 3 From the households in the selected Mauza, two strata 
were constructed:
Stratum 1 Household with 50 acres or more of land, 
or 50 or more animals.
Stratum 2 Households with less than 50 acres of land 
(including households with no land) or less 
than 50 animals.
From Stratum 1, all households (or the largest 10, whichever was
smaller) and from Stratum 2 sixty households were randomly selected for
the survey. In this way a total of 99,081 households were selected and
interviewed. However, due to non-response and errors of inconsistency,
etc. in the completed questionnaire, a final sample of 94,082 was
established. The data was then ’blown up’, by using a raising factor
equal to the inverse of the overall probability of selection of the
respective households, to represent a total population of 6,939,054
households, which represents the entire rural sector of Pakistan.
The data is in the form of a set of tables covering the
demographic and economic characteristics, source-wise borrowing by
size of farm, borrowing by interest rate for each source of credit,
expenditure and borrowing by purposes of expenditure and repayments.
These have been cross-tabulated against different categories of
households^ in the rural sector, for Pakistan as a whole. Aggregate
2data are also available for 17 of the 46 districts of Pakistan.
1 Except in the case of the interest rate tables which are cross 
tabulations between a range of interest rates and amounts of 
credit obtained at each level, for each of the lending sources.
2 These 17 districts are taken from the 19 districts of the province 
of Punjab and represent a cross section of agricultural 
conditions. Note we do not have district level data at the 
different households' level.
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The different caregories of households are:
1. Cultivators
a) Owner operators
b) Owner-cum-tenants
c) Tenants
2. Owner non-operators
3. Non cultivators
a) Services
b) Traders
c) Cottage industrialists
d) Labourers
e) Kammees or Moyens^
f) Others (not specified elsewhere)
Categories 1 and 2 are sub-divided into five farm size categories:
Up to 5 acres 
5 to 15 acres 
15 to 25 acres 
25 to 50 acres 
50 acres and above
This kind of tabulation restricts analysis at the micro or household level. 
Furthermore, since individual parameters are tabulated separately against 
the household categories, it is difficult to draw direct relationships 
between different parameters, for example, between credit obtained from a 
particular source and credit utilized for a particular purpose, or between 
rates of interest and repayment levels etc.
3.3 Limitations of the Data
In a national survey of the type of the Rural Credit Survey, 
some errors and inconsistencies are always bound to creep in. The 
quality of data from a sample survey depends on both the extent of the 
sampling and non-sampling errors present in the results. For this 
survey the sampling errors have been estimated for the major items 
of information covered by the survey, and are presented in Appendix 3.2.
1 The Kammee/Hoyen are the menial classes, a rub-off of the caste system, 
these include cobblers, blacksmiths, carpenters, etc.
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They reveal that the range of sampling error for most of the survey 
parameters is not very large. Of the various methods available to 
identify the extent of non-sampling errors, the one most commonly used 
is a post-enumeration survey. Unfortunately for the rural credit survey, 
such an exercise was not conducted. Other methods that come to mind 
can be: a) an examination of the data for internal consistency and 
reasonableness; b) comparison of the data with data from other sources; 
c) an overall evaluation of the effectiveness with which the different 
phases of the survey were implemented. As regards (a) and (c) above, 
the organisation conducting the survey ran several checks and tried to 
ensure that errors on this count were kept to a minimum.^" More 
specifically in the case of (a) ’a number of interrelationships revealed 
by credit data and the characteristics of the respondent households were 
examined’. Their conclusion was that ’the high quality of the survey 
estimates is reflected in the high degree of consistency of the data’ 
(Government of Pakistan, 1974) . The author has also examined the 
available data and the claim regarding the internal consistency of the 
data seems reasonable.
As regards the comparison of data with similar data from other 
sources for an examination of the quality of the data, a number of
1 The staff of the Agricultural Census Organisation underwent an 
intensive two week training programme. They were then sent to 
the field to interview ten households each. The questionnaires 
thus filled in were reviewed in joint sessions supervised by the 
State Bank of Pakistan, so that all doubts about the different 
concepts involved in the credit survey were cleared. In addition 
to this, the questionnaire was printed in the Sindhi language for 
use in the Sindhi speaking areas. On an average each enumerator 
was expected to complete about 650 questionnaires over the three 
month survey period. To further facilitate their access to the 
intended households, the cooperation of the village watchmen was 
elicited who were paid an honorarium for their cooperation.
Although the survey questionnaires were precoded, before the data 
was transferred to the computers, a manual editing was undertaken 
to check for cäses of non-reponse and obvious inconsistencies, 
after which the data was transferred to computer. A comprehensive 
computer editing programme was run to check for internal consistency 
and any errors were rectified.
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problems exist. As has already been stated, this was the first 
attempt in Pakistan at an exercise of this kind. Data on the various 
aspects of the rural credit structure in Pakistan, especially on the 
utilisation side, do not exist. The government does however publish 
data on the lending by four main institutional sources which is presented 
as Table 4.2. There are difficulties in the comparison of this data 
with the data from the rural credit survey. Foremost amongst them is 
the fact that the goverment data is for the financial year 1972-73 (July 
to June) whereas the rural credit survey data for borrowing from 
different sources pertains to the calendar year 1972 (January to December).
The survey report (Government of Pakistan, 1974) listed a number 
of factors based on the actual observations in the field during the 
survey that might have resulted in an under or over estimation of the 
different aspects of the survey results and these are listed below:
1) People in the rural sector are extremely reluctant to 
disclose information about the debt and credit aspects of 
their lives. Moreover they do not keep accounts and the 
memory bias, especially in the items of information 
pertaining to the preceding twelve months, needs to be 
discounted for.
2) Some respondents did not consider themselves under debt 
when they had taken loans from their friends and relatives.
This tendency, despite the vigilance of the enumerators, 
could have resulted in an under estimation of the total debt 
and the relative role of the non-institutional sources
of credit.
3) Credit requirements may have been over estimated. The 
questionnaire did not indicate the cost of credit, thus 
misleading the repondents to, in some cases, assume that
their credit requirements would be met free of cost. Thus 
this data will not enable us to estimate the demand for credit.
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A) Some respondents, especially big landowners, could have
intentionally supressed information for fear of land reform 
or the recovery of old debts.
5) The collection of information regarding interest rates
was fraught with a number of complications. The majority 
of the respondents, being uneducated, were not aware of 
the exact rate of interest on loans and worked on the value 
of the instalment of repayment and the number of repayments. 
The enumerators were instructed to calculate from this 
information the rate of interest, for listing in the survey 
response. However, the situation was further complicated 
when the loan, or part thereof, was in kind and/or the 
repayments were in kind or in part cash/part kind. This 
could have led to such loans being shown as loans at zero 
rate of interest due to the inability of both respondents 
and enumerators to calculate the rate of interest.
However, an awareness of the biases that could have crept into 
the data is important. In the hope that such biases will be consistent 
throughout the data, we can proceed to analyse the data, because we are 
interested only in a study of relative behaviour and not in absolute 
values.
3.4 Profile of the Rural Sector and the Aggregate Credit Picture (as
shown by the rural credit survey).
The data presented in this section form an interesting scenario 
in our study. The village is the basic unit of community life in 
rural Pakistan. A typical village is composed not only of farm lands 
and farmers, but a host of other occupational groups engaged in 
non-farming activities. Table 3.1 shows the percentage distribution
TABLE 3.1
DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS AND POPULATION 
BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE
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Type of Household
Households Population
Number
(m)
Per cent of 
rural
households
Number Per cent of
(m) rural
households
A. Farm 
1) Cultivators
a) Owner 1.73
b) Owner-cum-tenant 0.85
c) Tenant 1.20
Sub total, cultivators 3.78
2) Owner-non-operator 0.59
Total, all farms 4.37
B. Non-farm
1) Livestock holder 0.88
2) Services 0.27
3) Trader 0.18
4) Industrialist 0.03
5) Casual Labourer 0.82
6) Kammees 0.18
7) Others not specified 0.20
Total, non-farm 2.56
GRAND TOTAL, all rural 6.93
24.96 11.76 27.38
12.27 6.12 14.25
17.32 7.68 17.88
54.54 25.56 59.51
8.51 3.25 7.57
63.06 28.81 67.08
12.70 5.37 12.50
3.90 1.46 3.40
2.60 1.17 2.72
0.43 0.17 0.40
11.83 4.10 9.55
2.60 0.97 2.26
2.89 0.90 2.10
39.94 14.14 32.92
100.00 42.95 100.00
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of the rural households and the relative importance of different groups.
The farm population in the survey was defined to include rural
households who were cultivating land and/or had ownership rights in land
being cultivated by other rural families. Landless labour households
working on fields, and livestock holder households, normally included
in the farm sector, were defined to be part of the non-farm sector.
Even on this restrictive definition, the predominance of the farm sector
in rural areas is clearly brought out in the above table. Sixty three
per cent of a total of 6.93 million rural households are directly
engaged in agricultural activities. Within the farm sector, cultivators1 2 345
are the major group and account for 55 per cent of rural households.
the proportion of owner non-operator, i.e.absentee landowners, (who
do not operate any land at all) in the rural population is 9 per cent.
3Within the category of cultivators, owners are the largest category
4and constitute about a quarter of the rural households. Tenants are 
17 per cent of rural households while the owner-cum-tenants^ category 
accounts for little more than 12 per cent of rural households.
For the puposes of this study, we are concerned with cultivating 
households only. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of cultivating 
households by type of household and size of farm category. The table 
clearly shows that the majority of cultivating households (over 73 per
1 Household is defined on a ’per hearth’ basis, i.e. people eating 
food cooked at the same fireplace.
2 The cultivating households were strictly defined, as is generally 
done in Pakistan, on the basis of their operated land. So a 
household was deemed to be a tenant household, for example, if its 
operated holding of land was totally hired in, irrespective of the 
fact that the family may own land elsewhere that it did not operate.
3 Households that own all the land they operate.
4 Households that rent in all the land they operate.
5 Households that rent in a portion of the land they operate.
cent) are in the under 15 acres category (the up to 5 acres category 
plus the 5 to 15 acres category). This pattern is consistent in all 
types of tenure that make up the cultivating sector of rural Pakistan.
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TABLE 3.2
DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL CULTIVATOR HOUSEHOLDS
BY SIZE OF FARM IN EACH TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD 
(Per Cent)
Type of Household
Size of Farm (acres) Owner Owner -cum-tenant Tenant All
Up to 5 16.76 2.71 5.71 25.16
5 to 15 17.81 11.77 18.59 48.15
15 to 25 4.85 4.15 4.85 13.83
25 to 50 3.79 2.67 2.16 8.60
50 and above 2.51 1.21 0.48 4.17
All sizes 45.70 22.49 31.77 100.00
(3.78)*
Note: * The figure in parenthesis show the total number of cultivators
in millions . Note that the tenants are not the smallest farmers.
Table 3.3 reveals the larger disparities in the farm sector.
About 6 per cent of households own more than 46 per cent of the cultivated 
acreage in farms of over 50 acres each. On the other end of the scale 
a little more than one third of households own 5.3 per cent of the
cultivated acreage, in holdings of less than 5 acres. The situation 
arising out of this unequal distribution has implications for the delivery
of credit amongst different sub-groups in the farm sector.
The pattern of land distribution and the land tenure system provide 
an institutional framework within which land is used. The inequality in 
land distribution (see Table 3.3) and the terms and conditions on which
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land is used, jointly determine the distribution of income and 
productivity gains within different classes in the cultivating 
sector. These two institutional parameters have obvious implications 
for both the supply of and demand for credit.
TABLE 3.3
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP BY SIZE OF HOLDING
Size of Holdings Households Area Owned
(acres) Number
(’000)
As per cent 
of Total
Acres
(’000)
As per cent 
of Total
Up to 5 1057 33.4 2868 5.3
5 to 15 1272 40.2 10515 19.5
15 to 25 374 11.8 6455 12.0
25 to 50 282 8.9 9018 16.8
50 and above 178 5.6 24982 46.4
All sizes 3163 100.0 53838 100.0
Table 3.4 below presents some aggregate statistics on the credit 
structure of Pakistan. As can be seen from column 2 of the table, over 
one third of the households in each farm size category actually undertook 
some borrowing.'* ’
Although there are reasons to suspect that the credit requirements
data generated by this survey could tend to over estimate the true figures, 
■k
if these data are taken as rough indicators of the need for (or demand 
of) credit, it can be seen from Table 3.4 that credit requirements as a 
multiple of actual borrowing range from over 5 times to as much as about 10 
times (column 8). This is strongly indicative of the farmers perception 
of the importance of credit in their activities and of the capital
1 Increased indebtedness need not be an economically repugnant 
development if it is accompanied by increased productivity, 
as implied by Crawford (]969).
* if and only if.
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constraints they face. The increasing trend in this indicator with 
increase in size of farm is another aspect that needs to be borne in 
mind. If a comparison of column 2 with column 5 in terms of their 
difference can be taken as an index of the perceived credit gap, it 
can be seen that this gap is an increasing function of the size of 
farm, i.e. larger farms indicated a larger credit gap than smaller 
farms. This aspect has a number of implications warranting a closer 
look at the source structure and utilisation of credit. The question 
that arises is whether this greater demand is due to a perception 
of the profitability (i.e. increased productivity) that arises from 
the use of credit or simply a reflection of the attitude born out 
of a greater access by these households to credit.
3.5 Summary
1) The Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan, 1972-73, is a 
multi-stage probability sample survey which covered 
over 94 thousand households all over Pakistan
2) The survey results were 'raised* to represent the entire 
rural population.
3) The per cent sampling errors of the main survey items 
are generally acceptable (less than 5 per cent in nearly 
all cases).
4) The aggregated data reveals a skewed distribution of land 
ownership and a large perceived credit gap that is an 
increasing function of the size of farm.
CHAPTER 4
THE SOURCES OF CREDIT
4.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to bring out some of the 
complexities of the supply side of the Pakistani rural credit market. A 
well developed money market by allocating saving between different types 
of investment in a competitive way plays an important role in the process 
of economic development, in addition to promoting liquidity and safety of 
financial assets. It performs this crucial function by tending to bring 
about an equilibrium between the demand for and supply of loanable funds, 
thus bringing about an efficient allocation of resources; this also encourages 
savings and investment in a growing agricultural sector. Besides promoting 
financial mobility by ensuring a flow of funds between sectors, a well 
developed money market is crucial for the implementation of monetary policies 
of the central bank.
However, it is generally observed that in many developing countries,
the rural money markets are neither homogeneous (Wai, 1957 and McKinnon, 1973)
nor well developed. The Pakistani rural money market like the Indian one
1 2is also characterized by a duality. ’ A dichotomy exists both in the 
nature and working of the organised (institutional) and unorganised (non 
institutional) sources of supply in the rural credit market. The unorganised
1 See Cirvante, V.R. (1956).
2 Since there are several markets there is no single rate of interest.
Further such rates may be subject to regional, seasonal or cyclical 
variation depending upon the forces of demand and supply (Ghatak, 1976).
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or non-institutional category can be further sub divided into commercial
and non commercial lenders.^ The non commercial lenders like friends
and relatives and in some cases landlords lend at a zero (nominal) rate of
interest (explicit) and in most cases because of the general absence of
data on any implicit charges on their lending should not, strictly speaking,
2be included in any analysis of the supply side of the rural credit market.
3However, such non commercial lenders generally supply a substantial 
proportion of the credit requirements at present, and in a sense restrict 
the channeling of this segment of demand to the other sources of credit, 
thus inhibiting the growth of the organised sector and as such warrant a 
closer scrutiny.
The relative absence of the organised and efficiently working money
market and traditional savings and investment habits tend to divert savings
to the hoarding of bullion and some land transfers rather than used in
4capital formation.
All the positive attributes of a well organised and homogeneous money 
or capital market are restricted in a dualistic situation by the large 
unorganised portion in the credit market such as the one characterizing 
Pakistan. This has led the Government to intervene over time, and a 
number of institutional sources of supply of rural credit have been
1 See Nisbet (1967).
2 At the face of it, this is contrary to accepted notions of economic 
rationality. However, the social and temporal (life time reciprocity 
providing for a sense of security) aspects of these transactions make the 
economic analysis complex and difficult which is difficult to study through 
large scale surveys. Meticulous anthropological studies are needed to 
study this.
3 Such 'non commercial lenders' lend for reasons of kinship, friendship, 
reciprocity, tenure traditions and other reasons (Nisbet, 1967). In 
addition they may also lend for religious reasons.
4 See Ghatak, 1976.
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introduced. However, only four of the six existing sources of credit 
carry out normal banking operations,^- and this further restricts the size 
of the organised money market.
This chapter looks at the background and role of the existing 
sources of rural credit, the relative importance of the different credit 
sources and the problem of differential ’access’, in the rural credit 
market of Pakistan. The aim is to highlight the complexities and problems 
on the supply side of rural credit as they exist in Pakistan, and 
particularly in as they affect the small farm and tenant farm categories. 
4.2 Background and Role of the Lending Sources
The Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan, 1972-73, identified twelve 
leading agencies that were active in the rural sector of Pakistan. It 
listed six categories amongst the non-institutional sources and six in the 
institutional or organised sector. The non-institutional sources are:
1) Friends and Relatives
2) Professional Money Lenders
3) Land Owners
4) Commission Agents and Merchants
5) Factories, and
6) Others (a catch-all category designed to cover 
borrowings from non-institutional sources not 
listed above).
The institutional sources include:
1) Cooperative Societies
2) Cooperative Banks
1 All the rest are simply sources of supply of credit and do not accept 
deposits. See Section 4.2.
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3) Agricultural Development Bank of 
Pakistan
4) Commercial Banks
5) Taccavi Loans (government loan for 
disasters), and
6) Other Government and Semi Government 
Agencies.
4.3 Traditional (Non Institutional) Sources
Till 1947, the village money lenders constituted the dominant 
source of rural credit in the areas now comprising Pakistan. A typical 
money lender held an entrenched position in the rural credit field.
Apart from possessing the requisite capital, there were a variety of 
other reasons for his strong position as a source of rural credit.
He was located in the village itself and as such had complete knowledge 
about the actual and potential borrowers, which helped him minimise his 
risk. He was easily accessible to them, and above all his service was 
swift and with the minimum of formality. He normally did not question 
the purpose of borrowing; the sole criterion was the ability of the 
borrower to repay. The borrowers thus enjoyed certain advantages in 
borrowing from the money lender as against borrowing from other sources.
However, it is alleged that the disadvantages of borrowing from 
the village money lender far outweighed the advantages of easy access to 
credit (see Chapter 2). It is said that the terms of the loans were 
unusually harsh and in particular the rates of interest were usorious. 
More often than not, before a debt could be said to have been finally 
redeemed, the borrower had paid to the money lender a multiple of the 
amount of capital originally obtained. Credit obtained in this manner, 
though satisfying the immediate needs of the borrower, could not really
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promote agriculture or the well-being of the farmers. Generation after 
generation of farm families carried the growing debt burden and in the 
process, the loss of land through fore-closures was not an uncommon 
feature.
After the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947, the money
lenders, who were mostly Hindus, migrated to India. As a result, this
source of credit lost its traditional predominance. Post-independence
studies (e.g. Board of Economic Enquiry Punjab, 1955: p.27; Socio-economic
Research Project, 1964) of the agricultural credit situation in the
country, though limited in geographic coverage, revealed the eclipse
of the money lenders. The survey by the Board of Economic Enquiry Punjab
revealed that a major portion of the credit needs of the rural population
1was being met by 'relatives and friends'. It was found that 63.2 per cent
of the credit was provided by this source in the Punjab (Table 4.1). Another
important source of Credit was 'well-to-do rural people', who accounted
for 16.9 per cent of the credit disbursed in the Punjab. Marketing
intermediaries (such as shop-keepers and commission agents (beoparies))
provided 2.5 per cent of the total available credit. The money lenders'
share in the supply of credit was a mere 1.3 per cent. The other survey
conducted by the Socio-economic Research Project of the Punjab University
also found that 'relatives and friends' constituted the most important
source of credit for the borrowing rural population, accounting for
62.8 per cent of the total credit supplied to the cultivators in selected
villages of Lahore district of the Punjab. The contribution of 'well-to-
do rural people and landlords' was negligible. Marketing intermediaries
provided 5.1 per cent of the total available credit. The money lenders'
share was 1.1 per cent only. The findings of both the surveys in respect
1 A loosely defined term in that part of the world and used in these 
Surveys. It can-include, in addition to blood relatives and close 
friends, people belonging to the same clan or the .village. Although 
there is no compulsion on respondents to reveal details of their 
borrowing in surveys of this kind, it can be in some cases used as a 
convenient smokescreen for those who do not wish to reveal such details.
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of the relative importance of the various sources of credit are shown 
in Table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1
THE RELATIVE SHARE OF VARIOUS SOURCES OF RURAL CREDIT
(Per Cent)
Sources
Board of Economic Socio-economic
Enquiry, Punjab Research Project
1949 Punjab University
1964
A. Institutional
1 . Cooperatives 13.2 14.3
2. Government (Taccavi) 2.9 13.4
Total Institutional 16.1 27.7
Non Institutional
1 . Friends and Relatives 63.2 62.8
2. Well-to-do Rural People 
and Landlords 16.9 0.2
3. Shopkeepers 2.5 0.4
4. Commission Agents
(Beopari, Faria, etc. ) - 4.7
5. Money Lenders 1.3 1.1
6. Other Sources - 3.1
Total Non Institutional 83.9 72.3
All Sources 100.0 100.0
Source: Board of Economic Enquiry Punjab, 1955 (survey conducted 1949)
Socio-economic Research Project, 1964.
Although the two surveys did not identify borrowing from factories, 
this source has had. a role, albeit small, to play in the overall source 
structure of credit in what is now Pakistan, since the turn of the
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century. The reason why they are not mentioned in the non-institutional 
sources identified by these surveys could have resulted from the selection 
of the sample and the limited geographical coverage of these studies. 
Initially cotton ginning factories and oil expelling mills and in later 
years sugar mills have been known to advance loans to potential suppliers 
against standing crops. These short term loans are usually small and 
form part of the advance commitment of produce, a system that is common 
in certain areas of the region, especially in the Sind and Punjab.
4.4 Institutional Sources
The main sources of institutional credit in Pakistan, as has 
already been mentioned, are the coopoeratives, including cooperative 
societies and cooperative banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of 
Pakistan, commercial banks and the government (taccavi loans).
Cooperatives
The cooperative movement in the South Asian subcontinent has been 
predominantly a credit movement. Its inception was rooted in the desire 
to relieve rural indebtedness and the first legislation passed in 1904 was 
meant to provide a legal framework for the registration of primary credit 
societies on the Raiffeisen model of unlimited liability. In the light 
of the working of this Act, an amending law was passed in 1912 which 
extended the jurisdiction of the cooperative societies to include 
non-credit activities. The entire field was reviewed in 1914-15 by the 
Maclagan Committee. The beginning of the cooperative movement may be said 
to stem from the recommendations of the Maclagan Committee.^
With the introduction of the constitutional reforms in 1919, 
cooperatives became a provincial responsibility. Because of the limited 
budgetary resources of the provincial governments and the laissez-faire 
policies of the time, the pace of development was slow as relatively 
meagre funds were provided for cooperation as against other ’nation
1 See Eleanor (1950) and Qureshi (1947)
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building’ departments. There were also several other adverse factors: 
cooperation presupposes an environment of mutual trust, a keen desire 
for the common good as well as self-discipline. Lack of these 
prerequisites together with widespread illiteracy posed serious drawbacks 
to the cooperative movement. Moreover, the movement was essentially of 
an official character, which accounted for two of its weaknesses, viz.
(a) much depended on the temperament of the officers concerned and 
their faith in the cooperative movement, as a result of which the 
movement was rendered unstable, and its fortunes tended to fluctuate 
with the arrival and departure of the officers concerned; and (b) popular 
participation and desire for self-advancement which are a negation of the 
philosophy of cooperation got an upper hand.
In addition to the aforementioned drawbacks, two external factors 
gave a further setback to the movement. During the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, there occurred large-scale defaults on loan repayments as 
agricultural incomes fell sharply. Thus many societies became defunct 
as their capital got blocked or was wiped out by the defaults. Others 
suffered on account of the compulsory scaling down of debts in the wake 
of agrarian laws designed to reduce the burden of rural debt with a 
view to averting large dispossession of indebted landholders who were 
unable to meet their debt liabilities on account of falling prices.
The second factor came to operate, particularly in the Punjab, 
in the aftermath of Partition. The cooperative movement in the 
pre-Partition Punjab, particularly in the credit field, had been fairly 
successful. When Pakistan was established, the bulk of the officials 
and workers of the cooperative department, who belonged to the Hindu 
and Sikh communities, migrated to India. A great vacuum was created 
in the direction and management of the cooperatives. Although this 
vacuum was soon filled through the training of officers and personnel,
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which was arranged on a high priority basis, the lost momentum could 
hardly be regained.
It is generally known (and has been a recurringly dismal subject 
of endless enquiries and reports in Pakistan) that village cooperative 
societies have to a large extent become 'moribund1, an epithet that 
graphically visualises an image of the cooperative structure which is not 
only not growing, but is becoming progressively weaker and less active.
However, this has not been the case in India since Partition in 
1947. Musharraf (1980) found that the relative prominence and 
extraordinary performance of the cooperative societies in the Indian 
half of the Punjab was one of the factors that could be cited as an 
explanation for the greater fertiliser use and the differentials in 
cropping intensity that account for the much better growth of agriculture 
in that part.
Cooperative Banks
Central cooperative banks developed as a part of a federal pattern 
in which primary societies affiliated themselves with central banks at 
district and lower levels. The affiliated societies deposited their 
surplus funds with the central banks, which could direct them to other 
societies whose requirement exceeded their own funds. However, in 1959 
the Credit Enquiry Commission of Pakistan found that 'agriculture finance 
was not the primary focus of the cooperative banks' (Government of 
Pakistan, 1959). Out of the total advances of 215 million Rupees (Rs) by 
the cooperative banks in that year, advances to the agricultural societies 
amounted to only Rs 28.6 million, while the remaining advances were in 
the commercial sectors. Thus the banks were effectively siphoning off 
capital from the agricultural sector arid, to the advantage of the few 
influential rich who ran these banks, were investing them in the non 
agricultural sector. This situation continued until as late as 1976
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when cooperative banks were nationalised and subjected to drastic reform. 
However, until the year 1972-73 - the period of our study - the role 
and functions of the cooperative banks were along the lines described 
above.
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan
Since the objectives and functions of the already existing 
government Agricultural Finance Corporation and the Agricultural Bank of 
Pakistan were in many repects identical, the Credit Enquiry Commission 
recommended in 1959 their merger into a single institution. In 
pursuance of this recommendation, the Agricultural Development Bank of 
Pakistan was established in February 1961, by amalgamating the two 
institutions.
The bank provides credit to individuals as well as to corporate 
bodies engaged in agriculture which, according to the bank’s charter, 
includes crop cultivation, horticulture, fisheries, forestry, animal 
husbandry, poultry farming, dairy farming, bee-keeping and sericulture. 
Credit facilities are also provided to cottage industry in the rural 
areas.
Commercial Banks
The commercial banking system in Pakistan developed from an 
urban base with very minor inroads to the rural sector. By 1972, 
commercial banks had not taken on the role of financing agricultural 
production and their lendings in rural areas remained largely confined 
to the processing and marketing sectors of agriculture. In early 
December, 1972, the State Bank of Pakistan introduced a scheme for 
’Agricultural Loans by Commercial Banks’ which took effect from 
Decmeber 1, 1972. The scheme provided for advances by commercial banks 
to farmers for meeting their short and medium term agricultural credit 
requirements. Such advances would cover the financing of agricultural
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inputs, payment of wages of hired labour, purchase of cattle, tractors 
and other implements, dairy farming, installation of tubewells and land 
improvements. The State Bank of Pakistan Act was amended to allow the 
State Bank to make short and medium term loans and advances to the 
commercial banks, as re-finance, against their loans and advances for 
such agricultural operations, at 2 per cent below the bank rate.
Government (Taccavi) Loans
Since the end of the nineteenth century, provincial governments 
have been providing loans to agriculturalists, known as Taccavi loans, 
which owe their origins to loans made in times of famine and distress. 
Subsequently, however, governments also started providing these loans 
to agriculturalists for development and production. Taccavi loans are 
provided for specific purposes under the Land Improvements Loans Act' 
of 1883 and the West Pakistan Agricultural Loans Act of 1958 (which 
replaced the Agriculturalists’ Loans Act of 1883) and are administered 
by the provincial revenue departments.
The Land Improvement Loans Act of 1883 provided for long term 
loans for the following:
1) Construction and repair of wells, tanks and other works of 
storage, supply or distribution of water.
2) Preparation of land for irrigation.
3) Drainage, reclamation from rivers or other waters or 
protection from floods, erosion, et.
4) Reclamation, clearance, enclosure, etc. of land for agricultural 
puposes.
5) Such other works as the local government may from time to 
time declare to be improvements for the purposes of the Act.
Under the West Pakistan Agricultural Loans Act of 1958, loans were 
granted, in addition to the purposes stated in items 1), 2) and 3)
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above, for the relief of agriculturalists in distress as well as for the 
purchase of seeds, cattle, fodder, manure and agricultural implements and 
for rebuilding or reclaiming houses destroyed or damaged by floods.
The maximum period of repayment of loans under the Land Improvement 
Act is 35 years. The government is empowered by the Act to fix the 
actual period of repayment, not exceeding the maximum period fixed in the 
Act. Loans under the Agricultural Loans Act are to be repaid usually 
at the next main harvest or after two main harvests.
Security of loans under the Act of 1883 is the land of the borrower, 
on which an automatic charge is created without the formalities of a 
registered mortgage and collateral security. Loans under the Act of 1958 
are granted on a personal bond, supported in some cases by a surety.
Taccavi loans have also been used in the past by governments in 
power as a political tool to quell agitated small farmers. Loans are 
written off and repayments are not strictly enforced in areas that are 
considered to be political trouble spots.
Other Government and Semi Government Agencies
A number of organs of the government and government-run corporations 
also give loans, normally in kind or in the form of services, in the 
government's overall drive over time to introduce farmers to newer 
technology or to improve their land. However, these have played a minor 
role in the overall government policy on credit, in the sense that the 
government itself does not recognise them as a major source of credit.
The government publishes data on the credit disbursed by four major 
institutional sources."*"
4.5 The Erratic Trends in the Supply of Institutional Credit
Table 4.2 shows the disbursement of credit by four main institutional
1 This source is not included in the four main sources.
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TABLE 4.2
DISBURSEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
(million rupees)
Year ADBP"
Taccavi
Loans
Credit
Cooperative
Societies
Source
Commercial
Banks
Total
Actual Index
1964 to 1965 40.5 29.3 68.0 - 137.8 100
1965 to 1966 68.0 11.2 71.0 - 150.2 109
1966 to 1967 100.4 9.6 70.8 - 180.8 131
1967 to 1968 106.2 11.1 270.0 - 387.3 281
1968 to 1969 82.1 11.2 100.2 - 193.5 140
1969 to 1970 91.3 9.4 109.4 - 210.1 152
1970 to 1971 92.7 10.2 92.4 - 195.3 142
1971 to 1972 80.0 8.9 70.5 - 159.5 116
1972 to 1973 169.5 10.3 64.6 85.2 329.6 239
Note: Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan.
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1978.
sources during the period 1964-65 to 1972-73, as released by the 
government.
The erratic trends in the lending of all the institutional sources 
of credit during this period is symptomatic of the lack of correlation 
between disbursement by these sources and actual production trends (see 
Chapter 1). The increase in lending by the Agricultural Development 
Bank of Pakistan and the introduction of commercial banks to the source 
structure during the terminal years in the table above, reflect the 
keeness of a newly elected government to please its rural electorate with 
a dose of funds, rather than the result of any observable continuous 
pattern of increase compatible with production. The fact that a majority 
of the elected representatives of this government belonged to the rich 
landed aristocracy lends further credence to this assertion. On a base
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year to terminal year comparison, Taccavi loans and lending by cooperative 
societies actually declined.
An important effect of these fluctuations in the supply of 
institutional credit is that they would lead the farmers to view 
institutional credit as unreliable, thus leading them to continue to rely 
upon the non institutional sources of supply.
To get a rough idea of the adequacy of institutional credit over 
time, we estimated the total institutional credit per cultivated acre and 
per cropped area for the period 1964-65 to 1972-73 by taking the total 
institutional credit figures from Table 4.2 and dividing them by the 
figures for total cultivated acreage and total cropped acreage for the 
country as a whole, for each year, released by the Government of Pakistan 
.and published in the Government of Pakistan Agriculture Statistics of 
Pakistan 1975.
Table 4.3 shows the small values of institutional credit on a per 
cultivated acre and per cropped acre basis. Although the measures are 
crude since the acreage figures represent the combined acreage of 
borrower and non borrowers, they are indicative. It should be noted that 
these figures represent total institutional credit for all purposes 
combined, however, for comparison it should be noted that a standard bag 
of urea fertilizer was priced at Rs35/- during the year 1972-73.
4.6 The Small Share of Institutional Credit in Total Credit Supply
The discussion in Section 4.1 showed the various important functions 
that a large well organised rural money market can perform in the process 
of economic development. In this section we will attempt to show the 
relative importance of each lending source in the total supply of credit 
for each type of farm household. For this purpose we have calculated from 
the Rural Credit Survey data the percentage distribution of the total 
borrowing by each type of household across the sources as shown in
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TABLE 4.3
GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT: 
SOME ROUGH INDICES
Year
Institutional Credit 
Per Cultivated Acre 
(Rs)
Institutional Credit 
Per Cropped Acre 
(Rs)
1964-65 2.97 3.43
1965-66 3.16 3.91
1966-67 3.76 4.46
1967-68 8.07 9.25
1968-69 4.06 4.82
1969-70 4.42 5.07
1970-71 4.11 4.76
1971-72 3.38 3.88
1972-73 6.92 7.84
Note: 1. Cultivated Area = Net sown area + current fallow
2. Cropped Area = Net sown area + area sown more than once.
Table 4.4 and Appendix Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
Table 4.4 shows clearly the relatively small role of institutional
sources of credit supply in the overall sources (that service the rural
sector) for all types of household. Another feature is the declining 
*importance of institutional sources from owner households to tenant 
households. Borrowing from institutional sources account for only 3.03 per 
cent of total borrowings of the tenant household category. The Appendix
JUTables 4.1 to 4.3 also show a drastically declining trend in the importance" 
of institutional credit across size of farm in each type of household on 
a comparison of the largest size of farm category to the smallest size of 
farm category in each type of household. It is worth noting that 
institutional sources account for less than one per cent of the total 
borrowing of the under 5 acre category of tenant farmers (Appendix 4.3). 
Another important feature of Table 4.4 is the predominance of
* Relative importance.
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TABLE 4.4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL BORROWING BY SOURCE 
BY EACH TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD
Source Owners
Owner-cum-
tenants Tenants
All
Cultivators
1. Cooperative Societies 1.25 0.87 0.61 1.00
2. Cooperative Banks 0.41 0.36 0.17 0.34
3. Agricultural Development 
Bank of Pakistan 7.67 3.29 1.04 5.01
4. Commercial Banks 4.19 1.01 0.91 2.63
5. Taccavi Loans 0.88 0.37 0.13 0.57
6. Other Government and 
Semi Government 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.29
All Institutional Sources 14.71 6.10 3.03 9.79
1. Friends and Relatives 61.92 68.89 50.09 60.73
2. Professional Money 
Lenders 2.25 2.11 1.85 2.12
3. Land Owners 1.73 5.42 34.89 10.66
4. Commission Agents and 
Merchants 15.46 12.78 7.34 12.85
5. Factories 1.14 0.41 0.12 0.72
6. Others 2.71 9.29 2.71 3.13
All Non Institutional Sources 85.29 93.90 96.97 90.21
All Sources 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
• (1267.01) (591.13) (595.20) (2453.33)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are actual borrowing (in million rupees) from
all sources for each category of household.
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friends and relatives as a source of credit supply for all types of 
cultivators; this source accounts for nearly 61 per cent of the total 
credit supply to the cultivator households taken together. A perusal 
of Appendix Tables 4.1 to 4.3 reveals that this source increases in 
importance for the small size of farm categories in each type of household 
accounting for over 78 per cent of the total credit supply to the under 
5 acre category of owner farmers.
The table also shows the small role of the professional money lender 
in the overall source structure. However, commission agents and 
merchants as a source alone are more important than all the institutional 
sources put together for all categories of cultivators.^-
Another interesting aspect is brought out by a comparison of Table 4.4 
with the Appendix tables. It reveals that non institutional credit is far 
more equally distributed than land ownership, however, institutional credit 
is skewed in favour of the larger size categories.
Another measure to show the relative importance of different 
sources of credit can be the volume of loans from these sources related 
to the area cultivated by each category of household. Unfortunately we 
do not have data on the cultivated acreage of the borrowing households. 
However, the tabulations do contain data on the total cultivated acreage 
in each category. Table 4.5 presents calculations of the average borrowing 
from different sources per total cultivated area in each category. The 
table shows the very small amounts of institutional credit per acre in each 
size category. Two important aspects of the table are worth noting.
Firstly the largest size of farm categories exhibit a much higher value 
of institutional credit per acre in comparison to the smallest size 
categories in each type of household. This is significant if one considers
1 In the absence of detailed data, it is not possible to study lending by 
commission agents and merchants in greater detail.
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the fact that the distribution of cultivated acreage is significantly skewed 
in favour of the larger size categories. The second aspect is the 
pronounced negative trends in non institutional borrowing per acre with 
increase in size of farm.
It is generally maintained that smallest size of farm categories
and tenant farmers'*" would have a greater need for credit, vis a vis, the
other categories because of their lower average income and resource
endowments etc. If average borrowing per cultivated acre is any indication
of this need then total borrowing per cultivated acre in Table 4.5 proves
that the needs of the smallest size categories are certainly the greatest
vis a vis the other categories. However, the table shows that tenants,
2on an average, borrow less than corresponding categories in other
households. Also that this difference is not due to their lower average
borrowing from institutional sources, but that their average non
institutional borrowings are also lower than corresponding categories.
3However, if we exclude friends and relatives from the average total 
borrowing and from average non institutional shown in Table 4.5 we find 
that the per acre borrowing net of borrowing from friends and relatives 
especially in the case of non institutional credit is appreciably higher 
for tenants than for corresponding size categories of other households.
If we base our decision on the evidence in Column 6 and 7 then it can be 
said, subject to the limitations of the measure present in Table 4.5 that 
the relative credit needs of the small and tenant farmers are greater than 
those of other categories. However, for both these categories the needs,
1 It is assumed that since tenants would be paying a land rent their 
incomes would be reduced by this amount in comparison with the other 
corresponding farm categories.
2 Average here means per cultivated acre.
3 This is based on the assumption that friends and relatives from within 
the cultivator category loaning to tenants would be tenants themselves 
and thus similarly constrained. Friends and relatives (lending to 
tenants)who own land would more than likely fall under the classification 
of landowners.
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on an average, are being met to a greater extent by non institutional 
credit.
4.7 Differential TAccess’ to Rural Credit
Allied to the problem of the limited share of institutional (organised) 
credit supply in the rural sector of Pakistan is the problem of lower 
'access' of the tenant and small farm categories to this credit. This 
could have its roots, amongst other things, in the social and political 
influence of the large landlords. Of course central to the question of 
who gets how much of the supply is the question of eligibility embodied 
in the issues of credit worthiness and repayment capacity in an economic 
sense. However, since the emphasis of government policy and of literature 
on credit as an instrument of economic development is shifting more and 
more to small farm credit, it is important to study how the credit supply 
from different sources is spread across different categories of households, 
and whether any differentials exist across different categories, especially 
the small categories vis a vis the rest. Unfortunately we have no data 
on the eligibility aspects of this issue. Also as revealed in Table 3.4 
a substantial proportion of the households, i.e. 59 per cent of total did 
not borrow at all. It can be expected that some of these households may 
have tried to get loans but we have no information on ratio of applicants 
to loans made. This latter index would be important while studying 
'access' to institutional sources of the different categories of households.
In the light of the data constraints outlined above and of the 
limitations that these constraints impose upon a fuller analysis of the 
problem of 'access' we present in Table 4.6 two indices A-^  and A^, the 
first showing relative number of loans and the second the relative amounts 
or volume of lending, by each source across the different types of 
households, as partial evidence of the problem of differential 'access'.
The problem of access to the institutional sources is clearly 
highlighted by the figures presented in this table. In the case of all
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the institutional sources except 'other government and semi government 
agencies', the pattern is clear. Owners tend to dominate, followed by 
owner-cum-tenants and then tenants. The obvious reason for this can be 
that land is the most acceptable form of collateral for the institutional 
sources, and because of this, the tenant category have a restricted access 
to these sources. We have no way of estimating what proportion of this 
access could be attributed to this factor. However, even in the case of 
Taccavi loans which are government administered and do not have the strict 
collateral requirement of land, the pattern is the same. The fact that 
a significant proportion of the borrowers from each source belonged to 
the non-farm sector'*’ clearly signifies that security other than land is 
also acceptable to these sources. It is interesting to note that the 
Index for amounts of lending is even more skewed generally, than the 
Index (for numbers of loans), in favour of the owner households.
A conclusion that emerges from Table 4.6 is that tenants, whose 
relative need it can be assumed is the greatest, have a much more restricted 
access as compared to owners and owner-cum-tenants even after adjusting 
for their relative proportions in the total rural household (as shown in 
parenthesis on the table).
Looking at the second part of the table pertaining to non institutional 
sources, we see a reversal of the trend (for all non institutional sources 
taken together) in terms of the Index A^ than that observed for 
institutional sources. Tenants have a relatively greater access to non­
ins titutional sources than to institutional sources. -However, in terms 
of the index of relative amounts of loan A^ owners still tend to dominate 
followed by tenants and then owner-cum-tenants.
To look at the problem of access for small farmers, we computed the
same indices but this time A^ as the proportion of under 5 acre borrowers
1 Although we are interested in cultivator households only, we have
included the absentee landlords (owner-non-operators) and the non-farm 
households in this table to further highlight the problem.
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from a source in a particular type of household to the total number of 
borrowers of all sizes, in that type of household, from that particular 
source and as the proportion of under 5 acre borrowing to total borrowing 
from a source by the type of household (see Table 4.7).
These indices brings out the problem of access of the small farmers 
to all sources of credit and to the institutional sources in particular.
In terms of the Index it can be seen that although owner farmers in 
the under 5 acres category account for 36.37 per cent of all owner 
households; in terms of this access index they accounted for only 14.57 
of the owner households borrowing from all the institutional sources taken 
together. Similarly the under 5 acres owner-cum-tenant households which 
accounted for 12.04 per cent of the total number of owner-cum-tenant 
households showed an access index of 8.87 per cent only and the under 5 
acre tenants who accounted for 17.97 per cent of the total number of 
tenants, showed an access index of 8.62 per cent. The problem takes on a 
graver tone if we consider the second index A^. Although the under 
5 acres owner-cum-tenants showed a greater access followed by tenants and 
then owners, the overall inference that can be drawn from the table is 
that in small size farms the problem of access to all sources and to 
institutional sources in particular seems acute. It should be borne in 
mind that as stated in the beginning of this section, the two measures 
presented above are a very partial way of looking at the problem. The 
problem is quite complex and a number of other factors, mentioned before, 
need to be considered. However, in the absence of relevant data, the two 
measures presented above can be taken as indicative of the problem.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter an attempt was made to describe some of the problems 
connected with the supply side of rural credit. In the light of the data 
constraints described in the chapter the overall conclusions of this
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chapter need to be taken guardedly always bearing the constraints in mind. 
The main points of the chapter can be summarized as below:
1) Earlier studies reveal the eclipse of the rural money 
lender and the emergence of friends and relatives 
category as the dominant source of credit.
2) There has been an erratic trend in the credit 
disbursed by institutional sources, and this factor 
could have led farmers to view this credit as 
unreliable and hence continue to depend upon non 
institutional credit.
3) Institutional credit plays a relatively small role 
in the overall borrowing in all categories of 
households. Its importance is even smaller for 
households of the tenant category and the small farm 
households.
4) If actual borrowing per acre can be taken as an 
indicator of the need for credit, then tenant and 
small farm size categories exhibit the greatest need.
This need is met by recourse to non institutional credit.
5) There is evidence based upon the distribution of the 
number of loans and volume of loans that owner farmers 
and large size farmers get a major proportion of the 
supply of institutional credit. Within the limitations 
of the two measures of 'access’ used, it can be said 
that there is a problem of differential 'access', to 
institutional sources of credit. Institutional 
sources tend to concentrate supply to owner households 
and large size households whereas non institutional 
credit is much more proportionately distributed.
CHAPTER 5
THE INTEREST RATE STRUCTURE
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is the result of concern with three aspects 
relating to interest rates on rural lending that have important 
implications for the use of credit as an instrument for agricultural 
development in Pakistan. These are:
1) There is a consensus in some quarters that rural interest 
rates in LDCs are ’high' and extortionate in nature.
2) In view of this, and as a policy designed to boost overall 
agricultural production, most governments in LDCs attempt 
to keep rates of interest on institutional loans ’low'.
Krishna (1979) has argued that such a policy negates the 
overall development objectives (i.e. increased production 
and employment and a reduction in inequalities) because of 
the virtual monopoly of access to institutional sources 
by the large farm sector (see Chapter 4).
3) In view of the fact that Islam, the predominant religion 
of Pakistan, forbids the charging of interest and as we 
have seen in the last chapter a major proportion of credit 
is supplied by friends and relatives, it is logical to 
assume the existence of borrowing at zero rate of interest 
in Pakistan.
In the light of the points outlined above, it becomes important to study 
the structure of interest rates in Pakistan. This chapter first looks 
at the structure of interest rates from a theoretical point of view, 
and then presents an analysis of the data on the rural interest rate
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structure of Pakistan. This analysis examines:
a) the extent and sources of zero rate of interest borrowings, and
b) the range of rural interest rates in Pakistan.
5.2 The Determinants of the Rural Interest Rate
Several attempts have been made in the past to analyse the process 
of rural interest rate determination in LDCs, both at a theoretical level 
(Bottomley, 1971; 1975; Long, 1968; Wai,1957) and empirically (Chandavarker, 
1971; Ghatak, 1975; 1976; 1977). The process of interest rate determination 
is theoretically the result of the interaction of the demand for and the 
supply of credit. Because of the inherent difficulties in estimating 
demand side, most of these studies have attempted to analyse rural 
interest rates from the supply or cost side using an aggregative macro 
approach.
The rate of interest can be seen to be composed of:
a) the opportunity cost of capital
b) the overheads or administrative costs of the lending agency 
including costs of delivery and collection
c) the risk premium on lending
d) an inflationary premium on the loss in the real value 
of the money loaned due to inflation, and
e) monopoly profits based on the assumption of the existence
of monopolistic imperfections due to the fragmented nature of 
rural credit markets in LDCs.
The rest of this section examines these components in -a little more detail. 
From the lenders’ point of view, only the opportunity cost of capital is 
the pure rate of interest (Bottomley, 1964). The administrative or 
overhead costs depend on the nature and structure of the lending agency, 
the volume of lending, the size of loans and their periodicity. Bhaduri 
(1977) postulates that a lender's overall expected income from lending
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per unit of money loaned will be. the interest income per unit of 
money loaned minus the proportion of interest income lost due to 
default together with the proportion of default itself, or:
Y = r (1 - q) - q 
where
Y = overall interest income per unit of loan 
r = rate of interest on the loan
q = expected default proportion"'’
This means that the higher the value of q, the lower will be the 
expected income. This is the risk element in lending. Therefore the 
risk premium can be described as:
q (Q + 0)
S = --------
1 - q
where
S = risk premium 
q = default rate 
Q = principal
0 = opportunity cost or 'pure interest’
This means that interest rates prevailing in the rural sector are, 
ceteris paribus, a function of the repayment rate - assuming the 
repayment rate to be equal to (1 - q). It has been postulated that 
repayment rates are positively related to farmers’ income levels and 
since rural interest rates are negatively related to repayment levels 
(on account of the above), by transitivity, interest rates are negatively 
related to income levels. Using a model based upon the following three 
functional relationships and the fourth identity, Ghatak (1975) has 
empirically verified this for India. He postulated:
1 This formula is illustrative and for simplicity ’q’ in this formula 
implies indefinite default. See Bottomley (1975). Note that 'S’ is 
computed from the lender's point of view. The heroic assumption is 
that ’0’ and ’q’ are independent of the rate of interest. In reality 
’q’ would, ceteris paribus, depend upon the rate of interest also.
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R = F(Y) 
r = g(y) 
r = t|j(R) 
and Y = y 
where
R = repayment by cultivator as a percentage of loan 
Y = farmers’ income 
y = output of farm 
r = rate of interest
The model can be presented quite effectively in the form of a 
diagram (Figure 5.1).
FIGURE 5.1
DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING THE RELATIONSHIP 
OF INTEREST RATES TO INCOME LEVELS
Source: Chatal:, 1975.
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Figure 5.1 shows that if income (output) increases, repayments rise and
interest falls. It is clear that an increase in income and hence
repayment reduces the probability of default and hence a decrease in the
risk premium component in the interest rate, implying a decrease in the
*
interest rate and vice versa.
The inflationary premium is an adjustment factor or rate of
discount from the lenders’ point of view applied to adjust the nominal
rate of interest to the ’real’ rate of interest. Then the nominal
rate of interest minus the inflationary premium is the ’real’ rate
of interest. The inflationary premium is a factor that protects the
money lenders’ funds from losses due to inflation.
Bhaduri (1977) asserted that due to the fragmented nature of the
rural money markets, the resultant monopoly power of the lenders, and
the non-availability of 'acceptable’ collateral on the part of the
borrowers/ the lenders are able to undervalue the collateral offered
to a point where the entire risk of default is passed on to the
borrower. The reasons for this monopoly power are not only economic,
2but can also be institutional in nature. In addition to the under­
valuation of the collateral, the lenders can increase interest rates 
to a point where repayments actually exceed the value of the collateral.
This according to Bhaduri (1977) was the method used historically by 
rural money lenders in India to accumulate assets, because ’beyond a 
point the borrower would consider the burden of repayment irrational 
and the undervalued collateral would transfer to the-lender.
1 Which restricts the alternatives open to them and forces them to 
borrow from the unorganised sector.
2 For a discussion of the institutional aspects, see Ghatak (1975).
* The model is illustrative and pertains to single periods only. In a
multi period situation the relationship would be less obvious as output 
fluctuations average out over time. Because of data constraints arising 
out of the tabulation of the data, it is not possible to test this model. 
The data as it is available does not have, for example, cross tabulations 
between interest rates and income levels““ for corresponding repayment 
rates.
** There is no data directly on income levels in the Rural Credit 
Survey.
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5.3 Are Rural Interest Rates High?
It is generally held that rural interest rates in LDCs are high 
and extortionate in nature (Bhaduri, 1977). This is based on the 
assumption that rural credit markets in LDCs are not developed and 
competitive but are fragmented in nature(Mckinnon, 1973).
In the last section we have seen that rural interest rates are 
composed of a number of constituent items. Even if the monopolistic 
profit component is ignored and the functioning of a well developed credit 
market is assumed, the other constituent items of rural interest rates 
are economically valid and significant. Gordon (1975) has tried to 
show that even if the cost of capital is between 2 to 4 per cent (concessional 
rate on public capital) the nominal interest rate can range between 17 to 
29 per cent.'*" These figures, according to the author, reflect conservative 
estimates based on the experience of small farmer credit programs in 
LDCs, and are illustrative of the range (see Table 5.1).
TABLE 5.1
THE RANGE OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST RATES 
IN SHALL FARMER CREDIT PROGRAMMES
Costs Percentage
1 . Administrative 5 - 10a
2. Cost of Capital 2 - 4b
3. Allowance for Default 5 - 1 0  plus
4. Annual Rate of Inflation 5
17 - 29
Notes: a Excludes cost of technical 
b Concessional rate on public
assistance to farmers 
capital
Source: Gordon, 1975
1 Assuming that the cost (per cent) of credit = the interest rate.
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Lipton (1976) has also contended that so-called 'high' rates 
of interest in rural credit are not in reality high. If one looks at 
the returns to investment in agriculture, one finds adequate evidence 
to justify this proposition. For example, Singh (1978) found that the 
net marginal returns to fertiliser alone was 7 to 15 times its marginal 
cost in Bangladesh and 2 to 4 times in India.
On the assumption that low rates on credit, especially for key 
modern inputs can accelerate the diffusion of innovations, many Asian 
countries have deliberately kept their insitutional farm credit rates 
low. It was revealed in the Asian Development Bank’s (1977: p.97) Asian 
Agricultural Survey that except for Korea and China (Taiwan), all other 
countries had deliberately kept their institutional credit rates low as 
compared to the rates for non-farm commercial credit. In addition to the 
diffusion of innovation argument, the plea is that, in the absence of 
all else, subsidised credit is in a small way a means of redistribution 
aimed at the small farmers. There are several points that can be made 
against the puruit of such a policy (see Gonzalez-Vega, 1976).
Given the fact that large farmers in Pakistan have a much greater 
access especially to institutional sources of credit, they would tend 
to monopolise any possible benefits of these low interest rates.'*’ This 
can also cause an overinvestment in equipment, etc. which may remain 
unutilised and hence cause waste in addition to being labour displacing. 
Also, given the fungibility of credit, low interest rate credit can be 
re-lent at higher rates. These points suggest a negation of any tendency 
towards a lessening of the inequalities that exist in the agricultural 
sectors of LDCs and in fact suggest a possible widening of disparities.
1 We have already shown that the small farm sector has a greater 
potential for the effective use of credit to increase production 
and employment. A monopoly of access to institutional credit by 
the large farm sector, in addition to the arguments presented here, 
is also inefficient on overall macro grounds, as already mentioned.
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5.4 The Rural Interest Rate Structure in Pakistan
In Table 5.2 the percentage distribution of credit by rate of 
interest has been calculated. The most striking feature of the table 
is the fact that 86 per cent of rural borrowing in Pakistan was at zero 
rate of interest.
TABLE 5.2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWING BY RATE OF INTEREST
Rate Amount 
(Rs m.)
As Percent of 
Total
Nil 3154.62 86.05
0 to 1 2.39 0.07
1 to 3 31.29 0.85
5 to 6 41.84 1.14
6 to 7 47.94 1.31
7 to 8 97.37 2.66
8 to 9 16.41 0.45
9 to 10 178.58 4.87
10 to 15 22.92 0.63
15 to 20 7.28 0.20
20 and above 51.99 1.42
Total 3665.62 100.00
The other interesting feature is that borrowing at rates of 20 per cent
or above accounts for only about one and a half per cent of total borrowing 
5.5 Zero Rate of Interest Borrowing
Table 5.3 shows the distribution of the borrowing at zero interest 
rate of interest by source. Over ninety four per cent of the borrowing 
at zero rate comes from friends and relatives, land owners and commission 
agents and merchants, and nearly five per cent from 'other’ unspecified
7y
non-institutional sources. Thus nearly ninety-nine per cent of the 
borrowing at zero rate of interest is accounted for by these sources.
TABLE 5.3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ZERO RATE OF INTEREST BORROWING BY SOURCE
Source Amount 
(Rs.m)
As Percent of 
Total
1. Cooperative Societies 2.82 0.09
2. Cooperative Banks 0.32 0.01
3. Agricultural Development Bank 
of Pakistan 4.17 0.13
4. Commercial Banks 3.26 0.01
5. Taccavi Loans 3.26 0.01
6. Other Government and 
Semi Government 5.35 0.17 .
All Institutional Sources 19.18 0.61
1. Friends and Relatives 2012.28 66.67
2. Professional Money Lenders 8.10 0.28
3. Land Owners 289.92 9.19
4. Commission Agents and Merchants 565.92 17.94
5. Factories 18.16 0.57
6. Others 150.16 4.76
All Non Institutional Sources 3134.44 99.36
All Sources 3154.62 100.00
Explanation for Large Borrowings at Zero Rate of Interest
There can be several reasons for the large borrowings at zero
rate of interest, amongst which the elements of non-reporting of interest
rate^ due to the unawareness of it is quite important. The rural farmer
is illiterate and the bulk of his borrowing comes from non institutional
1 See Nisbet (1967) for findings along similar lines in the Chilean informal 
credit market.
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sources where the rates may be implicit and built into the repayment 
rather than being explicit. In most cases, an inability by the farmer 
respondents as well as the enumerator to calculate the implicit rate 
given the complex web of repayment plans, could also have been responsible 
for the large share of zero rate borrowing. Because of the different 
types of credit relationships prevalent, it becomes very difficult to 
determine a rate of interest on loans, as borne out by Kurups’(1976) study 
of a south Indian state which revealed that nearly two thirds of the loans 
did not explicitly specify a rate of interest.
The reasons for the large proportion of zero rate borrowing can 
also be explained on two grounds, viz. religious and institutional/ 
traditional. Islam, the predominant religion of Pakistan, strictly 
forbids the charging of interest, and in the rural areas of Pakistan it 
is practised with a fanatical zeal and strictness not seen anywhere else 
in the world. This would largely account for the zero rate of 
borrowing from friends and relatives. Further, Islam enjoins upon 
its believers to help each other in times of need. The concept is 
built around reciprocity and is very important in the socio-economic 
environment of the rural sector of Pakistan. It is also important to 
note that such borrowing can only be obtained in case of genuine distress, 
e.g.unforeseen expenses for social ceremonies etc. or consumption 
expenditure. Even in India where Islam is not the predominant religion, 
a large proportion of the borrowing from friends and relatives is at 
zero rate of interest (Ghatak, 1977).
In the case of landowners too, one of the explanations that can 
be given for the zero rate loans is that of religious obligation and the 
resultant social pressures. However, the relationship between landowner 
and tenant is also institutionally determined and is akin to the serf
system of feudal Britain in Medieval times. The tenant is more or less
1 Even in an inflationary situation, with a zero nominal rate of interest 
(negative real rcte), such lending (on a reciprocal basis) is established 
phenomenon. Detailed analysis of any implicit costs is not possible 
given the data constraints.
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bound to his master, providing all sorts of services at no cost, or 
much below the ’market’ rate for such services. Rudra (1975) in a 
survey of 77 villages in West Bengal found that two thirds of the loans 
given by landlords were at zero rate of interest. This and the findings 
set out in Table 5.3 would tend to negate the view put forward by Bhaduri 
(1973; 1977) as to the institutionally determined exploitive role of the 
landlord in rural lending. However, his arguments do have substance 
and although the evidence of large explicit zero rate borrowing from 
landowners do seem to suggest the contrary, the implicit costs, which 
unfortunately cannot be quantified due to the absence of data, are 
generally thought to be very high.
In the case of commission agents lending at zero rate of interest, 
it can be said without fear of contradiction that this is only so 
for explicit rates. Commission agents normally lend against an advance 
commitment of produce, and are able to under price repayments in such a 
way that the implicit rates of interest on their loans are high.
5.6 The Rate Structure of Interest in the Rural Credit Market of Pakistan
The weighted mean rate of interest^and its standard deviation has 
been computed for each source, after excluding borrowings at zero rate 
of interest from each source to see how the ’real’ rural credit market 
in Pakistan functions. The assumption is that the distribution of 
borrowing within each interest rate class interval is normal, i.e. the 
midpoint is truly representative. Table 5.4 below presents the results 
of this exercise.
The figures presented in this table confirm all a_ priori
2expectations. Institutional interest rates are ’low’ with a small 
deviation around the mean. The low rates reflect conscious government 
policy and are a feature also common to other Asian countries (Asian
1 Amount weighted
2 Relative to the non institutional interest rates
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TABLE 5.4
DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE RATE OF INTEREST 
AND STANDARD DEVIATION BY SOURCE OF CREDIT
Source Interest Rate 
(Mean)
Standard
Deviation
1. Cooperative Societies 8.60 2.47
2. Cooperative Banks 8.68 2.28
3. Agricultural Development Bank 
of Pakistan 7.15 1.32
4. Commercial Banks 8.87 1.40
5. Taccavi Loans 6.63 3.23
6. Other Government and 
Semi Government 6.43 5.26
All Institutional Sources 8.16 1.82
1. Friends and Relatives 9.25 9.72
2. Professional Money Lenders 18.53 12.99
3. Landowners 10.25 9.35
4. Commission Agents and Merchants 13.54 11.28
5. Factories 8.88 5.28
6. Others 11.28 11.12
All Non Institutional Sources 15.34 11.63
All Sources 10.34 7.06
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Development Bank, 1976). The non institutional source charge a higher 
rate of interest and are characterised by a larger standard deviation, 
possibly because of the nonrigidity of collateral requirements (due to 
the closer more informal contact with the borrowers) Although this table 
represents only fourteen per cent of the total borrowings, its implications 
for Pakistan have interesting consequences. Large farms (as has been 
seen earlier) with their greater access to the institutional credit 
sources are being, indirectly, subsidised quite inadvertently by this 
government policy. Whereas the smaller farmers, who borrow mainly 
from the non institutional sources, have to pay higher rates on their 
borrowing. Even those that borrow from Institutional sources do not 
benefit from these low rates because it should be borne in mind that 
the rate of interest is only one component in the eventual cost of credit. 
Bribes, travel to and from the lending agency, waiting and other 
procedural costs are also important and significant components.
There is evidence (Shahjahan, 1968) to suggest that the eventual 
cost of credit of borrowing from institutional sources is an inverse 
function of the size of farm. The low rates of interest that prevail in the
institutional credit market of Pakistan are subsidising the large farm
2 3sector, which goes against the equity criteria of low interest rates.
There is strong evidence, undocumented, of large farmers in Pakistan 
generally borrowing at these low interest rates and investing outside
1 Under the Amended State Bank of Pakistan Act 1972, the bank lends 
to institutional sources, to the equivalent of their advances to the 
agricultural sector, at 2 per cent below the bank rate. The bank 
rate during the period was raised from 5 to 6 per cent in May 1972 
and remained unchanged during the rest of the period to which this 
data pertains (Government of Pakistan; Economic Survey, 1972-73).
2 See Desai (1978) for a discussion of the equity objective of 
institutional credit for agriculture.
3 In addition to increasing the concentration of wealth in a few hands 
it negates the development requirements of increased employment
and greater income generation, because as has been found for 
Pakistan, larger farmers have lower labour absorption, lower cropping 
intensities and lower productivities (Salam, 1979).
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the rural sector because of the strong urban bias in the develoment 
process. This is a serious drawback in the credit structure of Pakistan 
which by all indications can only be expected to develop further if 
the problem is not rectified.
5.7 Summary,
1) The market rate of interest is composed of a number of 
constituent items.
2) Interest rates can be expected to very inversely with 
income levels.
3) Even when the cost of capital is kept between 2 - 4  per 
cent (Government concessional rates), the eventual interest 
rate can range between 17 - 29 per cent.
4) Concessional rates on institutional credit can negate 
overall development objectives, because these sources tend 
to be monopolised by large farmers.
5) Over 86 per cent of total borrowing in Pakistan is at zero 
rate of interest.
6) Over 99 per cent of the zero rate of interest borrowing is 
from the dominant non institutional sources.
7) This finding reinforces the assertion that non institutic_'.al 
credit is largely non productive.
8) The (amount weighted) rates of interest (average) after excluding 
borrowings at zero rate of interest are generally much
lower from the institutional sources than from the 
non institutional sources.
9) In the light of the monopoly of access of large farmers to 
institutional credit in Pakistan, these low rates are simply 
subsidising the large farm sector and leading to a further 
widening of disparities.
CHAPTER 6
UTILISATION PATTERNS
6.1 Introduction
One can view the demand for agricultural credit as a derived 
demand - derived from the demand for expenditure on the different 
enterprises of the farming business. This can be expenditure on 
investment purposes on farm or on family consumption expenditure or 
on other purposes connected to the farming enterprise. It has been 
contended that given the composite nature of the farming enterprise, 
it becomes difficult to separate demand for one from the other (Lipton, 
1976). This is a valid contention, and any study of the demand for 
credit for the different purposes of expenditure on farm should 
necessarily bear this in mind. However, in a situation like Pakistan 
where 68 per cent of the farms are considered to be below the 
subsistence level of holding^, it is easy to visualise that the 
primary demand will be for consumption or family expenditure. In 
addition to the small size of holding is the fact that most of 
these farms are also fragmented, which leads to the low levels of 
income and hence savings that can be ploughed back in terms of 
additional and improved inputs leading in turn to the low level 
of incomes."
1 See Chapter 1 and PIDE (1978).
2 See Chapters 2 and 4.
78
79
It is contended that in Pakistan rural indebtedness is usually 
the result of borrowing for non productive purposes.^- Dr M.H.Khan 
(1966) in his book ’The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development: 
a case study of Pakistan', with a foreword by Professor Colin 
Clarke, presents the following table to conclude that most of the 
rural indebtedness has resulted from borrowing for non productive 
purposes.(M.H.Khan, 1966, Table 35).
TABLE 6.1
AMOUNT OF CREDIT OBTAINED BY PURPOSE 
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL CREDIT OBTAINED,
AS REPORTED IN TWO PREVIOUS SURVEYS IN THE PUNJAB
Purpose Board of Economic Enquiry,
Punjab 1949
Amount as per cent of total.
Socio-economic Research Project, 
Punjab University 
Amount as per cent of total
Capital Expenditure
On Farm 29.9 19.6
Current Expenditure
On Farm 3.7 12.0
Total Expenditure
On Farm 33.6 31.6
Non-farm Business
Expenditure 13.5 1.2
Family Expenditure 51.4 62.0
Repayment of Debts 1.3 3.2
Miscellaneous Purposes 0.2 2.0
ALL PURPOSES 100.0 100.0
Source: Board of Economic Enquiry, Punjab 1951 (survey conducted in 1949).
Socio-economic Research Project, 1964.
1 The distinction between productive and non productive is at best 
a hazy one (see page 11).
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It can be said that, given the possibility of fungibility of
credit, money obtained for one purpose (i.e. family expenditure in
this case) can be diverted to another purpose (i.e. expenditure
on farm) and as such cannot be classified as 'non productive',
but such an occurrence would be more probable in a situtation where
the farmer's needs to feed and clothe himself and his family were not
paramount. Also this seems unlikely, if one accepts the finding
that the bulk of credit is being supplied by friends and relatives
on a zero (explicit) rate of interest (especially in the case of
borrowing by small farms). The possibility of borrowing for family
expenditure and then diverting this money or the farmer's own resources^
thus released towards productive on farm enterprise seems minimal,
given the socio-religious factors which govern such lending, and the
village structure of rural Pakistan, where the villagers are very
well informed about each other's incomes, needs, etc. However,
while it is impossible to say that such fungibility is completely
absent, it seems logical to assume in the light of the above that
it is only a marginal occurrence. This problem is more prevalent
in loans from institutional sources, because it is more likely to
expect an impoverished fa.rmer to borrow from institutional sources
for productive on farm purposes (these sources lend only for productive
on farm enterprises, see Chapter 4) if he can, and then utilise his
2borrowing for consumption purposes than for the reverse to occur.
For the purposes of this sub thesis we adopted a restrictive
definition of 'non productive' as an expenditure not incurred directly
1 Given the level of poverty, it seems unlikely for this to occur.
2 Cases are normally reported in Pakistan of poisoning when farmers
have eaten the treated seed given to them as in-kind credit.
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for the purpose of current on farm expenditure. While we accepted
the presence of the debate that consumption expenditure by the farmer
can be deemed to be productive, and that the exclusion of capital
expenditure on farm from our definition was serious, our concern in
this sub thesis and in this chapter in particular is only for the
deamnd for such credit as can directly increase productivity. As will
be seen later a major proportion of borrowing for capital expenditure
is for the purpose of purchasing land, which in the case of Pakistan
is unlikely to add to total productivity.'*’ This is reflected in the
fact that the total cultivated area had only varied marginally
2around 47 million acres for the five years preceding the survey, so
that any purchase of land on an average would only be a transfer
3and would not add to total productivity.
Also it should be borne in mind that in a land scarce, labour 
abundant situation, the emphasis should logically be on land saving 
technology as is embodied in the items which constitute current on farm 
expenditure and that labour saving technology as is embodied in 
machine technology, in some of the items which make up capital 
expenditure on farm, should have secondary emphasis.
When we talk of the demand for any commodity, it is always at 
a price. However, in the context of the rural credit market of Pakistan, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, over 80 per cent of the total 
credit was at a zero rate of interest (nominal and explicit). We have 
no data on the implicit costs of such borrowing and in the absence of 
this data an analysis of demand is impossible. Moreover the data 
available relates to the ex post utilisation of credit for different
1 Under the assumption that the less efficient sell to the more 
efficient one can expect a rise, but in Pakistan's rural areas 
with its imperfect capital market, this is not so.
2 Government of Pakistan, 1975, page 141.
3 For a definition of productivity, see page 12, footnote 1.
O  Oo ^
purposes, irrespective of the source or price (rate of interest) at 
which it was obtained.''" In the light of the above, this chapter
*
looks only at the utilisation patterns of credit, by studying the 
relative share of the different purposes of utilisation in the total 
utilisation of credit for the different categories of households.
The excercise is designed to show the relative importance of the 
different purposes of credit utilisation to the different categories 
of farm households. The objective is to see if farm households do 
in fact utilise credit largely for family consumption and social 
ceremonies, and if so, whether there are any variations across types 
of households and size of farm categories. Such an excercise will 
also highlight the relative importance of the ’productive’ on farm 
purposes in terms of credit utilised. In the latter part of this 
chapter an attempt is made to statistically test some relationships 
between yield, income level, the spread of institutional credit and 
credit utilisation for key on farm purposes, using aggregate data 
from seventeen districts of Pakistan.
6.2 The Importance of Different Purposes in Terms of Credit 
Utilised
Table 6.2 presents the utilisation patterns of credit for 
each type of cultivation household and for the cultivator category.
The table shows that only about 43 per cent of the total borrowing 
in the All Cultivators category is utilised for on farm enterprises 
(capital expenditure on farm plus current expenditure on 
farm), whilst the rest is utilised for other purposes. Borrowing
1 See Appendix 3.1, Question 16.
The purchase of land and animals, two indicators by which a man’s 
social position is assessed in the region, account for over half 
of the credit utilised for capital expenditure on farm in nearly 
all categories of farm households. See Appendix Tables 6.1 - 6.3.
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TABLE 6.2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWING BY PURPOSE OF UTILISATION 
FOR EACH CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD
Purpose/Type 
of Household
Owners Owner-cum-
Tenant
Tenant All
Cultivators
1. Capital Expenditure 
On Farm 35.39 38.99 27.49 34.22
2. Current Expenditure 
On Farm 6.59 9.33 12.29 8.59
3. Family Expenditure 30.96 33.70 43.64 34.61
4. Non Farm Business 
Expenditure 11.31 4.11 3.42 7.71
5. Other Miscellaneous 15.74 13.88 13.16 14.68
Total: All Purposes 100.00
(1254.44)
100.00
(582.24)
100.00
(564.23)
100.00
(2400.92)
Notes: Figures in parenthesis give absolute values of borrowing in millions
of Rupees. These figures may be lower than the figures for total 
borrowing by each category (Chapter 4) on account of the fact that 
some proportion of the borrowing may have been unutilised.
1 Capital expenditure on farm is made up of expenditure on 1) purchase 
of land, 2) land levelling and improvement, 3) well sinking and 
Persian wheels, 4) purchase and installation of tubewells and 
handpumps, 5) purchase of tractors, 6) purchase of tractor drawn 
machinery/imp 1. ements, 7) purchase of non mechanised agricultural 
implements, 8) purchase of bullocks and 9) purchase of other 
animals.
2 Current expenditure on farm is made up of expenditure on 1) hire of 
agricultural machinery, 2) purchase of seeds, 3) purchase of fertiliser,
4) plant protection, 5) payment of water charges/land revenue, 6) payment 
of wages and 7) product marketing/storage/transportation.
3 Family expenditure is made up of consumption expenditure and expenditure 
on social ceremonies.
4 Non-farm business expenditure includes expenditure on trade & handicrafts.
5 Miscellaneous expenditure includes payment of old debts and a catch all 
category of other unspecified expenditure.
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utilised for current expenditure on farm accounted for only 8.59 per 
cent of the total utilisation on an aggregate basis. An interesting 
feature is that for owner households, current expenditure on farm is a 
relatively less important item than for owner-cum-tenants and tenants 
respectively in terms of the utilisation of credit. Utilisation of 
credit for the purpose of family expenditure, which includes expenditure 
for social ceremonies, is the most important item, for all cultivators 
taken together, (largely because of its major proportion in the 
utilisation by tenants). It is still the second most important purpose 
of utilisation, for both owner and owner-cum-tenants for whom capital 
expenditure on farm is the most important. Another interesting feature 
is that the proportion utilised for miscellaneous expenditure which 
includes payment of old debts, is significantly higher in all categories 
of households than the utilisation of borrowing for current expenditure 
on farm. Findings that tend to lend support to our a_ priori expectations 
that the existing social set up and the tenurial and economic status 
of the farming household determines the eventual utilisation of credit. 
Figure 6.1 shows the relative importance of family expenditure, current 
on farm expenditure and all other purposes taken together, in terms of 
credit utilisation, for the different tenurial categories of cultivator 
households.
Table 6.3 shows the same distribution for the small farms (under 
5 acres) in each type of household, as was shown in Table 6.2 for each
type of household.
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TABLE 6.3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWING BY PURPOSE OF UTILISATION 
FOR UNDER 5 ACRE FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD
Purpose/Type 
of Household
Owners Owner-cum-
Tenant
Tenant All
Cultivators
1. Capital Expenditure 
On Farm 20.65 32.29 24.66 23.03
2. Current Expenditure 
On Farm 2.71 5.77 6.50 3.90
3. Family Expenditure 39.15 44.28 44.68 40.97
4. Non Farm Business 
Expenditure 15.16 3.02 6.62 11.79
5. Other Miscellaneous 22.33 14.64 17.54 20.32
Total: All Purpose 100.00
(273.92)
100.00
(55.78)
100.00
(84.36)
100.00
(414.06)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are absolute amounts in million Rupees.
Here the trends are much more significant and pronounced. The 
small farms utilise borrowings largely for the purpose of family 
expenditure (which includes social ceremonies) and for miscellaneous 
purposes (which includes the payment of old debts). Current on farm 
expenditure as a purpose of utilisation of credit is even less important 
for the small farmers in each category than the previous table showed. 
Utilisation for purposes directly related to the farming enterprise 
i.e. capital and current expenditure on farm account for only about 
27 per cent of the total utilisation of credit for the small farmers 
on an aggregate. (Figure 6.2 shows the relative importance of family 
expenditure, current on farm expenditure and all other purposes taken 
together, in terms of credit utilized, for the small farm households of 
the different categories). This has interesting implications for credit
Owner 
Owner-cum-tenant 
Tenant 
All cultivating farms
1
Type of small farm —
--
>
Note: 
1) 
Unshaded area represents proportion of credit utilised for current on farm expenditure
2) 
Horizontal shaded area represents proportion of credit utilised 
for family expenditure
3) 
Vertical shaded area represents proportion of credit utilised for all other purposes
Credit utilized
18
FIGURE 6.2
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CURRENT ON FARM EXPENDITURE, 
FAMILY EXPENDITURE AND 
EXPENDITURE ON ALL OTHER PURPOSES IN TERMS OF CREDIT UTILISED BY 
SMALL FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD
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policy in Pakistan. The institutional sources lend mainly for the
puposes specified under capital expenditure on farm and current
expenditure on farm. The government as a conscious policy propogates
the use of credit more for the items covered under current expenditure on
farm. But given the credit use patterns of the farmer (small farmers especially)
as indicated by these tables, any credit disbursed in cash is more likely to
be used first for the purpose of family expenditure. It is logical to
expect an impoverished farmer to feed and clothe himself and his family
or even to fulfil the obligations of society and tradition before he
can start thinking about improving his agricultural productivity.
Detailed tables of the constituent item-wise break up of the different 
puposes of utilisation for each size of farm category of the different 
cultivator households can be seen in Appendices 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.
The interesting features of the tables are:
1) An increasing trend in the importance of credit utilisation 
for both capital expenditure on farm and current expenditure 
on farm with an increase in the size of farm; and
2) A decreasing trend in the importance of credit utilisation 
for family expenditure with an increase in farm size.
These trends are most pronounced if one looks at the smallest size of 
farm category viz-a-viz the largest, in all three categories of 
cultivator-household,
6.3 Extent of Credit Used
To see the extent of credit used for each purpose, we computed 
an index of credit used as a proportion of the total expenditure for 
each purpose for the different types of cultivator households.
Table 6.4 shows that nearly 16 per cent of the total expenditure 
incurred by cultivator households was met through credit use. As much as
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TABLE 6.4
CREDIT UTILISATION FOR EACH PURPOSE
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON THE PURPOSE
FOR EACH CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD 
(Per Cent)
Purpose/Type 
of Household
Owners Owner-cum-
Tenant
Tenant All
Cultivators
1. Capital Expenditure 
On Farm 32.67 30.96 44.10 33.80
2. Current Expenditure 
On Farm 6.53 8.43 16.18 8.82
3. Family Expenditure 9.80 10.85 12.78 10.79
4. Non Farm Business 
Expenditure 21.57 32.78 40.10 23.77
5. Other Miscellaneous 18.00 15.54 18.28 15.82
Total: All Purposes 15.03 15.54 • 18.28 15.82
about 11 per cent of the family expenditure was met through borrowing.
This would indicate a negative propensity to save, at least for those 
borrowing households^ to whom these data pertain. Credit utilisation 
for family expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure for the 
purpose is highest for tenant farms. Table 6.5 presents the same index 
as presented in Table 6.4, this time for the small farms (under 5 acres) 
in each category of household.
More or less the same trends emerge from Table 6.5. However, the 
value of this index is higher for nearly all purposes for the small farmers 
of the different categories - implying the greater use of borrowed 
resources in nearly all aspects than the aggregate figures for the 
respective household categories that Table 6.4 had shown.
1 These borrowing households constitute nearly 41 per cent of the
total cultivator households in Pakistan (Table 3.4). The fact that 
59 per cent of the cultivators did not borrow, and we have no 
information on either the reasons why they did not or on their 
savings and incomes etc., makes it difficult to generalize.
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TABLE 6.5
CREDIT UTILISATION FOR EACH PURPOSE 
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON THE PURPOSE 
FOR THE UNDER 5 ACRE FARMS FOR EACH CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD
(Per cent)
Purpose/Type 
of Household
Owners Owner-cum-
Tenant
Tenant All
Cultivators
1. Capital Expenditure 
On Farm 35.69 45.96 49.13 39.71
2. Current Expenditure 
On Farm 7.01 11.46 16.38 9.63
3. Family Expenditure 10.19 14.98 11.60 11.00
4. Non Farm Business 
Expenditure 50.77 35.63 54.45 5o. 42
3. Other Miscellaneous 28.79 25.98 30.39 28.76
Total: All Purposes 17.01 20.78 18.35 17.71
To facilitate the comparison between family expenditure and
current on farm expenditure and the credit utilised for each, we have 
computed averages on a per cultivated acre basis in each type of household 
on the whole and in the under 5 acre category in each. The results of 
this excercise are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. It can be seen 
from the tables that the average amounts of expenditure and credit utilised 
for the purposes of current on farm expenditure are very small as 
compared to those for family expenditure. The striking feature of 
these tables is the much larger values for the small farm households.
This could have resulted partly from the fact that they need to borrow 
larger amounts for family consumption etc. and the fact that these 
expenditures are spread over the much smaller total cultivated acreage 
in the small farm categories, and in the case of the current on farm 
expenditure and credit utilised for this purpose, from the higher 
cropping intensities of the small farm household. These tables are 
indicative of the small amounts, in Rupee terms, of the total investment 
made, and credit utilised for the purposes of current on farm expenditure, 
and the correspondingly much higher averages for family expenditure.
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TABLE 6.6
AVERAGE EXPENDITURE AND AVERAGE CREDIT UTILIZED,
ON A PER CULTIVATED ACRE BASIS, IN EACH TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD
(Rs. per Acre)
i i
Expenditure Credit Utilized
Total Family Current 
On Farm
Total Family Current 
On Farm
Owner 422 200 64 63 19 4
Owner-cum-tenant 281 135 48 43 14 4
Tenant 232 145 32 42 18 5
All Farms 327 166 50 51 17 4
TABLE 6.7
AVERAGE EXPENDITURE AND AVERAGE CREDIT UTILIZED 
ON A PER CULTIVATED ACRE BASIS, IN THE UNDER 5 ACRE FARMS 
IN EACH TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD 
(Rs. per Acre)
Expenditure Credit Utilized
Total Family Current
On Farm
Total Family Current 
On Farm
Owner 1248 814 81 211 82 5
Owner-cum-tenant 797 488 83 163 71 8
Tenant 795 561 57 145 64 8
All Farms 1057 697 75 187 76 7
At current exchange rates, one Australian dollar = 
Pakistani Rupees.
Note: twelve
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6.4 Proportions of Credit Needs - Government Estimates
The Government of Pakistan works out the credit requirements each year 
in the following manner. On the basis of the available acreage estimates 
under each crop in each province,it estimates physical input requirements 
using the observed input : acreage ratios for different crops.
These physical inputs are then converted into cash requirements by 
multiplying with their input prices. The cash requirements are then 
adjusted for farmers 'own savings' which vary according to size of farm 
as well as types of input. Table 6.8 shows the government's estimated 
ratios for credit requirements to the farmers' total expenditure on 
these key inputs.
TABLE 6.8
GOVERNMENT ESTIMATED RATIOS FOR CREDIT REQUIREMENTS 
TO TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON VARIOUS INPUTS, BY SIZE OF FARM
Size of 
Farm/Inputs
Fertilisers Seeds Pesticides
(%)
1. Large Farms 25 5 10
2. Medium Farms 50 20 50
3. Small Farms 75
(13.17)
75
(11.24)
75
(0.02)
Note: Figures in parenthesis show our calculation of proportions of
actual credit used to total expenditure by small farms of the 
combined all cultivator category.
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1973.
93
The government’s process of estimation does not take into account 
the tenurial status (i.e. type of cultivator households) across which, as 
our analysis has shown, variations do occur (for example the tenant 
category uses (and thus may be assumed to need) more than other types 
of households for nearly all purposes of utilisation). However, it shows 
that the government makes generous allowances for small farmers and 
allocates credit assuming 75 per cent of total expenditure as credit 
requirements for each of the key inputs.
We calculated the actual credit use as a proportion of the total 
expenditure for each of these purposes for the small farms (under 5 acres) 
category of the aggregated cultivator households. These calculations 
are also presented in Table 6.8 in parenthesis below the government 
estimated ratios.
The contrast in these figures highlights the problem. The actual 
utilisation of credit for the current on farm purposes is much lower 
than the government estimates of the credit requirements for these 
purposes, especially in the case of the small farm category. It suggests 
that the problem of ’access' brought out by this study and the existing 
utilisation patterns restrict the productive use of credit even when it 
is available. Two possible inferences can be drawn from the glaring 
contrast in these figures:
1) Given the problem of access to institutional sources 
which is faced by these small farmers, they never get 
this credit.
2) If they do, their other needs compel them to use the 
credit for purposes other than these inputs and hence 
the small proportions of actual use in the case of
these inputs.
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6.5 An Examination of Basic Relationships
This section presents an attempt to examine some relationships 
between the utilisation of credit for different purposes and 1) yield 
per acre, 2) income level, and 3) the spread of institutional credit.
2We used the Spearman Rank correlation coefficient on data for seventeen
districts to test for the existence of positive relationships between
these parameters^
In all cases the form of the hypothesis is:
H : X. and Y. are independento 1 i
H : there is a tendency for larger values of X and Y
to be paired together.
Although the Spearman Rank Coefficient does not specify the 
direction of causality in the relationship, it suits our purposes as 
we are only attempting to establish the existence or otherwise of a 
correlation between these parameters. Table 6.9 shows the Spearman Rank
The use of a nonparametric statistic is an attempt at finding 
'approximate solutions to exact problems as opposed to exact 
solutions to approximate problems furnished by parametric statistics’ 
(Conover,1971). The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient is a 
powerful test. According to Stuart (1956), in a test for trend applied 
to random variables known to be normally distributed, the asymptotic 
relative efficiency of the Spearman was about 0.98.
3 Yield per acre of wheat is taken as a proxy for yield levels^ as wheat 
is the most important single crop in the area.
Ideally these relationships should have been examined separately for small 
and large farms and tenant farms and other farms. However, data are not 
available at a disaggregate level.
correlation between yield per acre of wheat^ and the average (per utilising 
household) utilisation of credit for different purposes.
2 where d = difference in corresponding ranks 
N = number of observations
1
TABLE 6.9
THE SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN YIELD PER ACRE OF WHEAT 
AND THE AVERAGE UTILISATION OF CREDIT 
FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES
Relationship y
Yield and average credit utilised for:
1) all purposes + 0.36
2) capital expenditure + 0.36
3) current expenditure + 0.37
4) family consumption + 0.16
Although none of the coefficients are significant, it is interesting 
to note that there is a positive correlation between yields and credit 
utilisation per household for all items of utilisation. The correlation 
between yield and credit utilised for family consumption purposes is 
also positive but weaker.
Table 6.10 presents the Spearman Rank Correlation between yield and
TABLE 6.10
THE SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN YIELD AND THE PROPORTION OF 
BORROWING UTILISED FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE TO 
THE TOTAL UTILISATION OF BORROWING
Relationship
Yield
to
and proportion of borrowing utilised 
total utilisation of borrowing for:
1) capital expenditure + 0.21
2) current expenditure + *0.42
3) family consumption expenditure + 0.03
Note: significant at 5% (one-tailed test)
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the proportion of borrowing utilised for a particular purpose to the 
total utilisation of borrowing. One would expect that yield levels 
would be positively correlated to the proportion of utilisation for 
current on farm expenditure.
The table shows that yield and the proportion of borrowing utilised 
for current expenditure on farm are in fact positively and significantly 
correlated. We had found in the previous section that one of the 
problems indicated by the utilisation structure was the small proportion 
(percentage) of utilisation of total borrowing for the pupose ofcurrent 
on farm expenditure, and that this problem was more acute for the small 
farmers. We now find a significant and positive correlation, on an 
aggregate level, between utilisation of credit for this purpose and yield - 
implying that the relative importance of this purpose is greater in 
higher yielding districts.
The Spearman Rank Correlation between income level^ and the absolute 
values of credit utilised for the different purposes is shown in Table 6.11
TABLE 6.11
THE SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN INCOME LEVEL AND THE ABSOLUTE 
VALUES OF CREDIT UTILISED FOR THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES
Relationship ys
Income level and amount of credit utilised for:
1) all purposes
2) capital expenditure
3) current expenditure
4) family expenditure
kNote: significant at 5% (one-tailed test)
k
+ 0.45
J-
+ 0.58"
k+ 0.59
k+ 0.44
1 The gross value of marketed surplus per household for each district 
is used as a proxy for income levels.
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The choice of the gross value of marketed surplus as an index of 
income level was strengthened by the assertion that 'credit facilities 
are an integral part of the commercialization of the rural economy'
(World Bank, 1975). Since the income level thus computed is also an 
indicator of the degree of monetisation and coomercialisation of each 
district, it was hoped that it would also take care of the argument that 
the extent of and eventual utilisation of credit is a function of the 
user's awareness of its profitability.'*’ We see that all the correlations 
presented in Table 6.11 are positive and significant.
Perhaps a better indicator of the importance of each purpose of 
utilisation at different income levels is the correlation between income 
levels and the average utilisation of credit for the different purposes 
on a per utilising household basis, as this would tend to normalise 
the effect of the variations in size of the credit utilising population 
across districts.
TABLE 6. 12
THE SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN INCOME LEVEL AND AVERAGE 
UTILISATION OF CREDIT FOR THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES 
ON A PER UTILISING HOUSEHOLD BASIS
Relationship Ys
Income level and average utilisation for:
1) capital expenditure + 0.21
2) current expenditure + :k0.54**
3) purchase of fertiliser + 0.66
4) family consumption + 0.27
Note: * significant at 5% (one-tailed test)
* *  significant at 1% (one tailed test)
1 Through greater interaction with the market
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Table 6.12 shows chat even on a per household basis all the 
correlations have the same sign (+ve). However only the correlations 
between income levels and average credit utilisation for current on farm 
expenditure, and income levels and average credit utilisation for the 
purchase of fertiliser are significant.
To study the spread of institutional credit and its relationship 
with utilisation patterns across districts, we calculated two sets of
correlation coefficients. In the first instance we calculated the 
correlation between the absolute values of credit obtained from 
institutional sources and the absolute values of credit utilised for 
the various purposes.
TABLE 6.13
THE SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE VALUES OF CREDIT 
OBTAINED FROM INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES AND THE ABSOLUTE VALUES 
OF CREDIT UTILISED FOR THE VARIOUS PURPOSES
Relationship Ys
Credit obtained from institutional sources
and credit utilised for:
**
1) capital expenditure + 0.69
2) current expenditure +
:k
0.43
3) purchase of fertiliser +
*k
0.53
Note: * significant at 5% (one-tailed test)
** significant at 1% (one-tailed test)
Table 6.13 shows that all the correlations are positive and significant. 
However the importance of institutional sources to credit utilisation for 
different purposes can perhaps be better brought out by the correlations
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between the share of credit obtained from institutional sources and 
average utilisation f°r different purposes.
TABLE 6.14
THE SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SHARE OF CREDIT OBTAINED 
FROM INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES AND AVERAGE UTILISATION 
FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES
Relationship Ys
Share of institutional credit and average 
credit utilised for:
£
1) capital expenditure + 0.44
JL
2) current expenditure + 0.42
£
3) purchase of fertiliser + 0.43
Note: * significant at 5% (one-tailed test)
We can see from Table 6.14 that the greater the role of institutional
credit, the greater is the average credit utilisation for all the 
purposes mentioned in the table.
6.6 Summary
Bearing in mind the composite nature of the farming enterprise, 
and the possibility of fungibility of credit as discussed in Section 6.1, 
the main points highlighted by this chapter can be summarised as below:
1) Over a third of the credit utilised is for the purposes 
of family expenditure (which includes expenditure on 
social ceremonies). This proportion is.higher for 
tenants and small farms.
2) Current expenditure on farm accounts for a small
proportion of the total credit utilised.
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3) Nearly 16 per cent of all expenditure is met through 
borrowing. The proportion of credit used to total 
expenditure is however much lower for current on farm 
expenditure.
4) The actual credit utilised for current on farm 
expenditure by small farms is much lower than government 
estimates of their requirements for these purposes.
5) Credit used for current on farm expenditure is 
positively and significantly related to yield, income 
level and the spread of institutional credit.
CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There is a school of thought in agriculture economics that believes, 
that in many developing countries including Pakistan, the small farm sector 
has a relatively greater productive potential and labour absorption 
capacity. It is generally believed that this sector faces an investment 
constraint, which if removed through the provision of credit, would lead 
to the fulfilment of three overall development objectives:
a) increase production and productivity;
b) increase employment; and
c) reduce the existing inequalities.
However, in most developing countries, it is contended that the 
rural money markets are not well developed, lack homogeneity and are 
fragmented in nature. Moreover, it is also maintained that there are 
problems in the demand side of rural credit. Generally the result of the 
low and fluctuating levels of income, and aggravated in cases by 
traditional and social pressures, a significant component of the demand 
for credit is for family expenditure (for consumption purposes and social 
ceremonies etc.).
In the absence of organised and developed money markets, governments 
tend to intervene by introducing organised (institutional) sources of 
credit. But the mere introduction of these sources is not enough and the 
problems persist.
This study set out to examine these problems by analysing the source 
structure and utilization patterns of rural credit in Pakistan; focusing 
in particular on the problems as they affect the small farm and tenant farm 
categories of rural households.
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The analysis is based largely on a set of preliminary tables from a 
very large benchmark survey; the Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan 1972-73, 
in which 94 thousand households all over Pakistan were interviewed.
However, the analysis was severely constrained both in terms of its depth 
and rigour, by the range and form in which the data were available. Apart 
from the fact that there were serious shortcomings in the survey 
questionnaire itself which made proper economic analysis difficult, only a 
small portion of the total range of data collected was available here for 
analysis. In addition to this shortcoming was an even more serious one 
imposed by the from in which the data was available. It suffered on two 
counts in this respect. Since the data are available in a set of tables 
that show cross tabulations between individual parameters and different 
categories of households, it seriously inhibited the establishing of direct 
relationships. Secondly the data tabulations severely restricted the 
degrees of freedom for any rigourous hypothesis testing, i.e. there is 
only one value for each parameter for each category of household.^
Working within the constraints imposed by the limitations of the 
data the study found that there are a number of complex sometimes related 
problems in the rural credit market that could seriously affect the use of 
credit as a catylst for agricultural development in Pakistan.
On the supply side this study found that the institutional (organised) 
credit supply has been only a small proportion of the total credit supply.
Its inadequacy is reflected in the small averages per cultivated and per 
cropped acre. Moreover, this supply has tended to fluctuate from year to 
year on the basis of the time series figures released by the government.
These fluctuations can lead farmers to view institutional credit as unreliable, 
thereby leading to the continued reliance by farmers on non institutional 
sources.
1 There are thus only three values - one for each cultivator category - for 
the small size of farm category, in which we are interested, for each of 
the available parameters.
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Not only is the dominance of the unorganised (non institutional) and 
the relatively small share of institutional supply of credit brought out by 
the study of the percentage shares of different sources in total credit 
supply, but the exercise also highlighted the large proportion of credit 
from friends and relatives. These ’non commercial’ sources of supply are 
detrimental to the growth of a well organised and developed credit market 
in the sense that they constrain the channelling of that segment of demand 
to the other sources. There are reasons to believe that the supply of 
credit from the friends and relatives category is utilized primarily for 
’non productive’ purposes. These reasons have their basis in the socio­
cultural economic and religious background of the area. Unfortunately 
given the survey questionnaire design and data constraints we have no way 
of rigourously establishing a direct link between borrowing from this 
source and its utilization.
The analysis of the supply side of rural credit in Pakistan also 
revealed interesting variations in supply by different sources across the 
different categories of households. We found that although the share of 
institutional credit in the total borrowing of all categories of households 
is small, it is much smaller for tenant households and households of the 
small farm category accounting for as little as less than a percentage 
of total borrowing in the small farm tenant category. The study also 
found that 'access' to institutional credit, both in terms of number of 
loans and volume of loans, is dominated by the large farm categories and 
the owner farms. Although the measure of 'access' used,in the absence of 
requisite data,ignores the crucial question of eligibility, in terms the 
credit worthiness and repayment capacity of the borrowers, the results of 
this study are significant. Given the government policy of subsidising 
institutional credit by advancing to the institutional sources to the extent 
of their total lending at two per cent below the bank rate, it shows that 
government policy is indirectly subsidizing the large farm and owner farm
categories, thus widening existing disparities.
If the average amounts borrowed per cultivated acre are any index 
of the need for credit then the study found that the small farm categories 
have a much greater need, and that this is met largely through non 
institutional credit. However, it was found that tenant farms on an 
average borrow less per cultivated acre, than corresponding size categories 
in the other types of households. This was not due to their much lower 
borrowing from institutional sources, but they borrowed less from non 
institutional sources also. However, if we exclude borrowing from 
friends and relatives from the non institutional borrowing we find that 
tenants borrow on an average more than corresponding size categories of 
other types of household.
The analysis of the interest rate structure showed that theoretically, 
for institutional sources, even if the cost of capital is between 2 to A 
per cent the eventual nominal rate of interest can range between 17 to 29 
per cent, because of the different components of the rate of interest, if 
the problem is approached purely from the supply or cost side. The data 
for Pakistan shows that interest rates are generally low^ and institutional 
interest rates much lower than non institutional rates (if we ignore for 
the moment the question of lending at zero rate of interest). This 
finding taken together with the finding that institutional sources supply 
mainly to the large and owner farms, reinforces the assertion that 
government policy to keep institutional rates of interest on agricultural 
loans is subsidizing the large and owner farm sectors. .
The analysis of interest rates in the rural credit market of Pakistan 
also found the presence of large scale lending at zero rate of interest 
(nominal and explicit). The study also found that over ninety-nine 
per cent of such loans were made by the non institutional sources and the 
bulk of these by the friends and relatives category. The absence of an 
explicit interest charge on rural lending can be explained through
1 Based on the Bank rate in 1972-73.
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religious and socio cultural factors. However, the possibility of 
implicit charges on such lending cannot be ruled out completely. In 
the absence of data on such implicit charges it is very difficult to say 
categorically that such lending is interest free. This is an area that 
needs to be researched much more thoroughly especially in orthodox 
traditional Islamic societies like Pakistan.
However, the absence of an explicit rate of interest on lending 
especially by friends and relatives imposes a social constraint on the 
utilization of such borrowing. The economic socio cultural and religious 
factors operating on such lending seem to suggest strongly that its 
utilization will be largely for non productive purposes. If one accepts 
the assumption that borrowing from friends and relatives is utilized for 
’non productive’ purposes then it can be said that over sixty per cent of 
the total credit supply is non productive in nature. This proportion is 
higher in the small farm categories.
The study of the ex post utilization patterns reveals that credit 
is utilized largely for family expenditure and within our strict definition 
largely for ’non productive’ purposes. The study also reveals that credit 
utilization for family expenditure purposes is much higher in the small 
farm categories. Correspondingly the study finds a much lower 
utilization for the purposes of current on farm expenditure, both in 
terms of percentage utilization and average per acre utilization of credit 
(where the amounts utilized are almost insignificant).
The large proportion of credit utilized for family expenditure 
especially in the small farm categories is born out of the general levels 
of poverty. A pattern can be seen between the large proportion of credit 
utilized for family expenditure and the larger proportions of borrowing 
from non institutional sources especially from friends and relatives 
especially in the small size of farm categories.
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For the purposes of this study a very restrictive definition of 
’productive’ utilization was adopted. This was done consciously in the 
light of the literature in agricultural economics that places greater 
emphasis on land saving technology in the labour abundant situations like 
Pakistan. This technology is embodied in the purposes of utilization 
defined as 'current on farm’ for the purposes of the survey data tabulations.
The study found that there is a large discrepancy between the large 
government estimates of the credit requirement for key on farm expenditures 
and the small actual credit utilized, by the small farm category.
Using aggregate data from seventeen districts of Pakistan the study 
established a positive and significant correlation between credit 
utilization for current on farm expenditure and 1) yields; 2) income levels 
and 3) the spread of institutional credit. These findings fit in with 
a priori expectations. The positive and significant correlation of 
credit utilized for current on farm expenditure and income levels is of 
particular interest. One can infer that at lower levels of income, 
credit utilized for this purpose is low because consumption purposes take 
precedence over all other purposes - i.e. lower the income higher the 
importance of consumption expenditure.
The limitations of this study are generally outlined below. There 
is a great dearth of data and published material in Pakistan on the 
economic and social aspects of rural life, especially about borrowing and 
expenditure behaviour. In addition to this a number of important items 
of information were left out of the Rural Credit Survey, questionnaire, 
and only a small portion of data collected, were available here for 
analysis. Further because of the form in which data were available here, 
it was not possible to formulate and rigorously test hypothesis along the 
lines of the thesis objectives. The fact that the data show that over 
86 per cent of total borrowing was at zero rate of interest (nominal) and
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we had no information on the implicit: costs on such lending;, made a rigorous 
analysis of the rural credit market according to the principles of demand 
and supply, impossible. The data also showed that 59 per cent of the 
rural cultivator households did not borrow, but we have no information on 
their incomes, savings expenditure patterns etc. or whether they did in 
fact try to get credit, to be able to study the problem of access in detail.
A survey of literature was undertaken to see the kind of analysis 
that could be possible but which unfortunately given the data constraints 
could not be undertaken. In Chapter 2 a model for the demand of production 
credit was set out. However, in the absence of information on the farmers 
supply of cash and other liquid assets, their productive opportunities and 
risk averseness etc. the model could not be further developed and tested. 
Similarly in Chapter 5 a model showing the relationship between interest 
rates and income levels was presented. Here again in the absence of data 
on different income levels and corresponding repayment ratios for different 
interest rate levels, the model could not be emperically tested.
However, given the survey procedure, the large sample size and the 
fact that the available data pertained to "blow up" figures on the different 
items of information, so as to represent population parameters, and that 
this was a bechmark study it was hoped that a description of the source 
structure and utilization patterns of rural credit in Pakistan could be 
attempted with a view to highlighting the impediments to the effective 
utilization of credit for agriculture development in Pakistan.
In the light of the government policy to encourage the use of credit 
especially by the small farm sector, the study started within the premise 
that the mere availability of credit is only a necessary condition for its 
productive utilization. In the light of the economic socio cultural, 
historical and religious background of the area, the study identified a set 
of factors that could affect the productive utilization of credit. Much 
more detailed work is needed to be able to rigorously establish the effect
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of these factors both on the supply of and demand for productive on farm 
credit.
Since this is the first time an exercise of this kind has been 
conducted for Pakistan, and especially since this is the first time the 
Rural Credit Survey 1972-73 data has been put to analysis, its limitations 
as highlighted by this study should prove useful in the direction of 
future research and particularly in the framing of future questionnaires.
In the meantime the results of this study can be taken as 
indicative of the general complexity of the problems involved and borne in 
mind during future credit policy making.
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APPENDIX 3.1
RURAL CREDIT SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE
Government of Pakistan 
Agricultural Census Organization
(Translated from the original)
Form 2 - R.C.S. 
Questionnaire for 
Rural Credit Survey.
1. District_________  2. Sub-division_________ _ 3« Tehsil _____
4. Mouza name __________  5» Had Bast ho. 6. Mouza SI.No.
7. Name of head of household with father’s name
8. Serial number of this household as in Column 3 of Form—1
9. Number of household members I
Total
members
iTen years or above Less than ten years
Male Female Male Female
1 2: ________ 3 4 5
!
!>
!
i I I
11
i
Note: Information about all the household members should be provided 
collectively in this form.
10. Is-any member of this household
a member of a Co-operative Society? Ho / 1 7 Yes / 2 /
11. Are you able to obtain adequate
amount of credit as and when needed? No / " 1 /, Yes/ 2 /
12. Do you prefer loan in cash or in kind
Cash / 1 / Kind /  2 /
13. Did your household take a cash
or kind loan in the last 12 months No / 1 /
Both / 3 /
Yes / 2 /
Note: Ii Uaswex' to question No.13 is ’Tlo" skip to question N0.I6
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14: Record here the monetary value of credit obtained in. cash 
or kind during the last 12 months from various sources.
Source of Credit
Total
amount
of
loan
Loans 
with i 
Amount 
of
loan
payab
n__l8
Type
of
sur­
ety
le
months
Loans payable 
with in 5 years
Loons payable 
after 5 years
Inte­
rest
rate
Amount
of
loan
Type
of
sur­
ety
Inte­
rest
rate
Amount
of
loan
Type
of
sur­
ety
Inte­
rest
rate
uOC
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10
a. Co-operative 
Society 01
b* Co-operative 
Bank 02
c. Agri-Develop. 
Bank 05
d. Commercial 
Banks„ 04
e. Taccavi 
loan 05
f. Other Govt, 
or Semi- 
Govt .Institu­
tions C6
g. Friend/ 
relative
----*—
07
h. Professional 
Money Lender 08
i. Landlord
09
j. Commission
agent/merchant
10
k. Industrial 
units 11
1. Other sources 12
n. Total amount 
of loan 13
Nil / /
15. How much of the total loan was received in kind 
(give = in Rs•) ________
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16. Investment made for various purposes during the previous 12 
months and the Credit needs for the next 12 months. II
i
Purpose '
Imount invested out of 
joans (Ps.)
Amount
invested
from
personal
sources
Amount
of
credit 
needed 
for the 
next 12 
months
Code
:joans due 1 ‘ 
In 18 \
months
joans due I 
within 5 
/ears i
joans 
iue 
after 
? years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a. Purchase of Land 01
b. Land Clearing, 
grading and 
Layout.
02
c. For well/persian 
wheel
03
d. Installation of 
pump or tube-well
o4
e. Purchase of 
Tractor 05
f. Purchase of 
other agri­
cultural mach­
inery and trac­
tor drawn 
implements
06
g. Purchase of 
bullock cart 
and agricul­
tural imple­
ments other than 
machines.
- 07
h. Hiring of 
machinery
j_
08
i- Purchase of 
seed and 
seedlings
!I
I 09
j• Purchase of 
Chemical fer­
tilizers
10
k. Expenditure on 
plant production 
measures i
Iij
ij
11
1. Payment for
land revenue and 
water rates
I ■4--------
12
ra. Payment for 
hired labour
! ! 
i !i J___________ 13
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
n. Payments for Trans­
portation of farm 
produce to Market 
and storage.
14
o. Purchase of oxen 15
p. Purchase of other 
animals 16
q. Marriage expenses 17
r .  Household expenses 1 8
s. Business purposes 1 9
t. Industrial 
Investment 2 0
u. Payments for 
previous out­
standing loans
j 21
v .  Other expenses 22
w . Total
| _______
»
!
23
113
17. Provide below the details of various outstanding loans obtained HI 
fron various sources.
Sources of Credit
Total amount 
of outstanding 
loans
Outstanding Loans, with 
schedule of Payment
»ode
Loans due 1 
within 18 v 
months
_/oans due 
mithin 5 
years
Loans 
due I
a f t e r  5 
years
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. Co-operative 
Society i01
b. Co-operative Bank ---------- ri ° re
 I
c. Agricultural Develop­
ment Bank. 03
d. Commercial Banks 04
e. Taccavi Loan 05
f. Other Government 
and Semi-Government 
Institutions 0 6
g. Friend/relative 07
h. Professional money 
lender 08
i. Land lord 09i
j. Commission agent 
& merchant 10
k. Industrial units 11
1. Other sources 12
m. Total amount of 
loan
;
i 13|
n. Loan given to 
others Ii i !14
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l 8 .C u t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  o u t s t a n d in g  l o a n s  how much was p a id  b ack  XV
from th e  f o l l o w in g  s o u r c e s  d u r in g  th e  l a s t  12 m on ths .
S o u rc e s  I Amount p a i d  back
1 2
a .  S a le  p r o c e e d s  o f  farm  p ro d u ce
b .  F ro c e e d s  o f  p r o p e r t y  s o l d
c .  O th e r  income
d .  B orrow ing
o- Payment i n  k in d |i
19 . I f  th e  d e s i r e d  amount o f  c r e d i t  i s  made a v a i l a b l e  t o  y o u ,  i n  how much 
t im e  p e r i o d  can you r e p a y  t h a t .
Amount o f  c r e d i t  needed Repayment p e r i o d Amount
( E n te r  th e  amount T o t a l  
from t o t a l  o f
column 6 o f  th e  r"s -----------
q u e s t i o n  no 16) Kind
VJith i n  12 months 
W ith  i n  5 y e a r s
N ote : I f  c r e d i t  n o t  
r e q u i r e d  go t o  
q u e s t i o n  N o .21
A f t e r  5 y e a r s .
/
20 . W h a t  ty p e  o f  s u r e t y  you can p r o v id e  t o  o b t a i n  c r e d i t
Type o f  s u r e t y Amount
q u a n t i t y
Value Amount f o r  w hich  
t h i s  p r o p e r t y  i s  
a l r e a d y  m ortgaged
1 2 3 4
a .  Land A c re s
K a n a ls » >
b .  M achinery  
—
Co Ornaments
l“ "--------------------—
d. Farm P roduce
--- i
e .  O th e r  |
A c re s  | K a n a ls  v
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‘-'l. -total area owned by this household 
22. Owned area self cultivated
22. a. Area rented in fron others on
-ül22-re crooning, lease or other terms
T  1 _____H -  . 1  . ‘ ~b. Land lord's share in farm produce of
the share cropped area /
24. Total operated .area (22 + 23a)
23. Cultivated area (a) Total
(b) Irrigated
(c) Unirrigated
26. Area under or chards
27. Total number of cows and oxen etc. /_____f 28.Total number of
buffaloes etc. /____/
29. Total number of sheep / / 30. Total number of goats / 7
NOte: number “ r(25-a) is negative .skip to'question
31. Crops sown, their output, output marketed or Exchange for other 
produce and the amounts thus received during the last 12 months.
I ICrop iCrop area
Aci'es Kanals 
!
I
i
Quantity of farm| 
produce(maunds)
Quantity of 
produce sold 
or exchange 
for some other 
produce.
Amount
received
-
1 ; 2 3 4 5
U -!
Wheat 1
. - . . 1
i
Cotton 2
j
P.ice j
-------------------------------- ------ -----1_______________ i 3
Maize
4
Tobacco
I —
5
Oilseeds
6
Sugarcane
(i) Cane . 1
(ii) Gur/Shakknr
(iii) Raw Sugar i j
-------------------i_______________ _
i
• ••
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3a. Do you prefer share cropping or lease system?
(1) Sharp cropping £  1 / Cash lease Q  / Lease in form kind
payment / 3 / Cash and kind lease /  4 /
33. Advance marketing agreements made for various crops during the last 12 months.
Farm produce
Quantity for 
which advance 
agreement made
Terms of Advance-Agreement 
Price settled 
and amount 
received in 
advance
VII
Amount received Amount
in advance but rece-
price fixed at ived ±n
the time of advance
good's delivery but price
settled 
at a
date fix­
ed by the 
landlord
Other
Terms
--------------- ----- - ---------- ‘ i—   r ; / j  / / y /
3t- liS3 y re’ ^ C T ^ ^ t x o n  of this household
.c^ac^_J_y3usinoSs £ T J Industrial £ J J  Casual labor / T  7
/ 5 7 cthoi /T 7  ---
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APPENDIX 3.2
COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION (PER CENT SAMPLING ERRORS)
FOR IMPORTANT RURAL CREDIT SURVEY ITEMS 
FOR PAKISTAN
Total Loans Taken (in 12 months) 4.69
Total Outstanding Debts 4.69
Total Repayment in 12 months 5.00
Repayment Capacity
Within next 12 months ’ 3.87
During first 5 years 4.58
After 5 years 6.16
Total Institutional Loan Taken in 12 months 3.98
Total Non Institutional Loan Taken in 12 months 3.87
Total Investment in 12 months 4.58
Capital Expenditure 4.47
Current Farm Expenditure 6.08
Family Expenditure 3.46
Total Credit Utilised 4.90
Capital Expenditure (Credit utilised) 4.12
Current Farm Expenditure (-do-) 5.20
Family Expenditure (-do-) 4.47
Cultivated Area 2.83
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1974.
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